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

Reflections on America:

Taft
after Twenty Years

Lindley Clark
on the Business of America

Patrick Cosgrave
on The Mind of Toryism

★

R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.
the Sorrows of Young Elmer

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the ALTERNATIVE to bare the witness and the truth

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☆ The Continuing Crisis ☆

● September! A month of brummagem and gas. After threatening for months to unveil their 1974 masterpieces, the auto industry and the television industry suited their actions to their words and once again astounded the civilized world by surpassing all earlier abominations, including the 1955 DeSoto and the recently exhumed Jack Paar Show. In fact this year's automobiles are so ugly that it is probable they will be displayed at the Musée Nationale d'Art Moderne. Even more repulsive are the new television shows, many of which have come under the investigation of local mental health associations. John Ford died on the last day of August. On September 3 the gas shortage eased when Congress reconvened.

● Judge John Sirica ordered President Nixon to come forth with his tapes, a decision which the President's barristers appealed. And in Vancouver, Washington, the president of the American Bar Association, Inc. says that Watergate has "badly hurt the image" of lawyers.

● Reports of cannibalism seeped out of the jungles of New Zealand and Washington. From New Zealand came word that primitive tribesmen had dined on the tender parts of government game warden Felix O. Johnson, B.F., and from Washington came reports that White House assistant presidents were dining on the tender parts of Vice-President Agnew and Treasury Secretary Schultz, among others. The "Perfect Master," Maharaj Ji, now touring America for the first time, has come down with ulcers.

● On September 10 President Nixon sent Congress a second State of the Union Message, consisting mainly of fifty reheated legislative proposals. Earlier he spoke *appasionata* of his aspirations for his second administration, an administration which is now revving up furiously though it remains in neutral. And in San Francisco, Gamaliel Washington and his ninety-three-year-old mother were arrested for mail fraud. Authorities uncovered their scheme to sell stocks in a nonexistent corporation that supposedly would franchise a swanky string of fortunetelling salons throughout California, New York, and Massachusetts.

● It appears that a new mode of thrill-seeking has claimed its first victim, rock star Steve Perron, who *Rolling Stone* reports "died from inhaling vomit during his sleep." Hundreds of lawyers and judges from 115 countries met in Abidjan to discuss world peace through world law, a larger mob assembled in Algeria to discuss the prospects of what pundits call the Third World, and a smaller mob met in Nairobi to discuss the mysteries of the International Monetary Fund. President Marcos banned women's slacks in the Philippines, and trade un-

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Editorial

The Sorrows of Young Elmer

A favorite ploy for exposing the lamentable benightedness of America's bourgeois citizenry, resorted to by suburban schoolkeepers and related tin pot intellectualoids whose cosmopolitanism is intimately bound up with their subscriptions to *Intellectual Digest* and *Psychology Today*, is to relate some horror story about a recent survey according to which only 3 percent of the nation's graduating high school seniors can actually identify the United Nation's first secretary-general or perform some other bit of utterly useless pedantry. As these tony dolts see it, America has sunk to the civilizational level of Guatamala if herds of students do not know the names and addresses of senators, representatives, supreme court justices, and other grandees of power and influence. Knowing such stuff is a sign of civic vigor and intellectual acuity, and I expect that these exaggerated school marms put it down as a very auspicious omen that the news media, today, abound with superficial reportage about everything from the futile showboating of some dubious political ne'redo-well to those few but genuine episodes of statecraft, which still occur in the great Republic.

In fact, today—unlike, say, the 1920s or the 1930s—our newspapers are so obsessed with their own strikingly sophomoric view of politics, that wisps of it drift even into the sports page, the entertainment section, and of course the women's page. Nowadays political high jinks is the transcendent concern of every ambitious young reporter, and that is why I personally shed a tear for young Elmer Wayne Henley, drop-out and admitted accomplice in the butchering of twenty-seven Houston children.

Had young Elmer followed his singular libidinous vibrations in the 1920s or the 1930s his celebrity would have been instant and enduring. With luck he would have inspired an affecting ballad in Woody Gutherie or an *ad hoc* committee headed by Theodore Dreiser and the Greenwich Village geniuses. If the Dreiser crowd were sedulous enough in puffing young Elmer into a cause, it is a certitude that sometime off in the glorious 1960s young Elmer, now passed off as the pathetic victim of American injustice, would become the subject of a Hollywood melodrama and the source of bounteous emoluments for some artsy Hollywood producer and afterhours radical. But because young Elmer chose to be a swinger in the 1970s his legend will slip quietly from the headlines, for his is an embarrassment to some and a bore to others.

Now of course the avocation of mass murder has always had its disadvantages, even in the 1930s. And, though Elmer's celebrity would have been assured in the 1930s, so too would have been his fate. Quite simply, and the humane pettifoggers notwithstanding, young Elmer would be granted his constitutional day in court...thence his moment in the chair. With a flip of the switch he would be put out of his misery, and he would not have had to share his headlines with a 1930s edition of Sam Ervin, say Theodore Bilbo. Finally, as he set forth on his mysterious journey to the land of harps he would be secure in the knowledge that he loomed large in the conversations of his countrymen. For the uncomplicated Americans of yesteryear recognized a twisted monster when they saw one; neither were they too jaded nor too enlightened to be appalled and outraged by atrocity.

Today the Dreisers have prevailed, and though we do not as yet have an *Ad Hoc Committee To Free Young Elmer*, we do have searching essays from the *Los Angeles Times* and the Associated Press, which reach to the heights of McKuenesque poetry. These bogus specimens of *belles lettres* are the proud creations of moral idiots and romantic ignoramuses. Nevertheless, they are typical of what young Elmer can expect—in brief: 1) a sincere attempt to understand the roots of his sufferings, 2) the marshalling of a regiment of mountebank psychiatrists to attest to his misfortunes, 3) an elevated lecture or two on the primitive state of American society from some moron ACLU lawyer, 4) internment in a secluded calaboose or nut house, and 5) leisurely oblivion. In a decade or so the Dreisers of this world will discover that young Elmer has been devoting his waking hours to composing a new international language of bird calls or to teaching abandoned pigeon chicks to fly. They will spring him, and he will enter upon a quiet life of good works. Alas and amen.

The luckless young Elmer will fade from the American consciousness with the swiftness of a Manson or a Speck. He will as quickly evanesce from the headlines as Mr. Richard Whitman or Mr. Juan Corona. For the contemporary American newspapermen have tarried too long from their political gardens. Some of them have devoted weeks to Elmer's case and that is about the longest any of them can refrain from turning their noses to Washington. What is more, the political nuances radiating from this counterculture prodigy are discommoding in the extreme. So it is back to politics for them all. The journalistic buzz which surrounded the ghoulish doings of Lizzie Borden or John Dillinger or Pretty Boy Floyd will never accompany the ghost of our Elmer. He is a victim of his times.

Not only is the modern American press going to deny him notoriety, it is going to overlook the wickedness of his achievement. He will be portrayed as complicated, sensitive, troubled, victimized, and possibly creative. He might even be portrayed as a youth deeply troubled by war and urban sprawl, but never will a pundit portray him as evil. For there is in the capacious treasury of American folklore an alluring myth according to which creatures like young Elmer are seen as something quite opposite from the evil wretches civilized men know them to be. They are victims —victims of a suffering situation, Kenneth Minnogue might say—and possessors of all sorts of spurious and ironic characteristics which inspire earnest literary efforts in third-rate reporters, which thrill demented readers, and which set wings flapping amongst the cuckoos of reform. According to this myth, the alleged murderer is, as I have suggested, the possessor of many ironic qualities, most of which make his alleged crimes a bit more fascinating and bourgeois America a bit less respectable.

Thus young Elmer's bemused confession had hardly been uttered before the Associated Press bilged forth with an idiotic article by some frustrated creative writer entitled: "Who is Elmer Henley? Youth's Life Has Been An Uphill Struggle." May my tongue curl into a tight little ball if that was not the title of what must now be certified as a classic rendering of this great American myth! With the care of a master craftsman the author has stuffed into his story every idiotic variation of the myth, including the claptrap about how the alleged criminal's life has been fraught with imponderable ironies.

Our AP poet begins his fable by contrasting young Elmer's grisly achievements with an obviously contrived personality profile drawn supposedly from his neighbors' reminiscences. Accordingly, we are given glimpses of the fabulous young Elmer as "the considerate elder of the family, trying to fill an absent father's role, going to his brothers' school to check on their progress." He is "reflective," a man whose "memories were his own," and who sought a change of cell because the boorish prisoners "were abusing him." Naturally he is "intelligent," "always gentle," and "always polite." No less an authority than his minister, the Rev. Matt Chambers, is summoned to scotch those readers inclined to snicker: "he was not different from any boy.... He had a deep sense of responsibility and felt he was a breadwinner." So there you are! Elmer Henley, future astronaut!

In a haunting conclusion our AP poet once again nudges our consciences, "Who Is Elmer Henley?" If it is any help I might add that the enigmatic young genius so bent on service and self-improvement was arrested for assault with a deadly weapon in 1971 (age 15) and for burglary and theft in 1972 (age 16). The year after that he was assisting the authorities in exhuming the remains of twenty-seven children, many of whom he had admitted to torturing and murdering.

My heart overflows with lachrymal juices for this ambitious young man. Even now as his abbreviated fame wanes, an insensitive press refuses to note the authentic wickedness of his achievement. To the contrary, it cruelly runs him and his colleagues through the Great American myth mill and leaves them encrusted with bourgeois decency

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and merchantable paradox. As the *Los Angeles Times* suggestively chronicles: "after Elmer was jailed in the mass murder, he [Elmer's lawyer] talked to him one day on the telephone about meeting his mother in the courtroom the next day. He said 'Will I be able to kiss mama?' " What irony! What pathos! What bosh! It goes without saying that the dastardly authorities refused this tender request. Oh it is a perverse world we live in. All of its heroes are behind bars. All of its idealists are victims. It is almost as if society's "leading citizens" and "authorities" were conspiring against benevolence, for not only do signs of an essential sweetness beep beep from young Elmer, but likewise they emanate from the homosexual electrician who tutored him, as the intrepid reporters of the *Times* of Los Angeles were quick to perceive. From their researches they found he was always "polite, quiet and pleasantly harmless." Most intriguing of all, he was "nice to children." So once again the subtle intellects of American journalism are telling us that that which is obvious is illusory and that which is illusory is reality. Young Elmer and his kind have been wronged. Politics is where wrongs are righted, and with that the whole mob of sophists gambols back to Washington.

Obviously, the Dreisers are at the controls. The fact that the Americans of today do not enter upon vast national discussions about the deeds of young Elmer only makes life at the controls all the more blissful. The clod reporters who fashion literary pastiches around the grim deeds of vile miscreants only make Dreiserian rhetoric all the more plausible (one reporter actually described Mr. Dean Corll's life as a "modern American tragedy"). All the flummery about human rights, no matter how contrived and removed from human existence, merely makes it all the easier for these self-styled progressives to snatch young Elmer from the hangman and tuck him away under the supervision of social scientists, psychiatrists, and social workers, until such time as he can be graduated into civil society. And here is another reason why I shed a tear for young Elmer. He is about to receive the same heartless treatment that Americans visit upon their college students. Millions of college students suspect that this is a fate vastly more unpleasant than the electric chair. And every intelligent American knows that it is a less healthful experience.

R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

The Business of America

by Lindley H. Clark Jr.

Lessons in Free Enterprise (I)

What follows is the first of four columns by the associate editor of the Wall Street Journal *on the practice of business in America.*

In the mid-1920s Calvin Coolidge stirred the wrath of political liberals when he declared, "The business of America is business." Yet what he said was true in 1925 and it remains true today, even though the role of business in this relationship is often badly misunderstood.

Government capitalizes on the misunderstanding. At the moment the government is operating a vast network of regulations and regulators, all of it devised to keep wicked businessmen from raising prices. Washington gets away with this approach because the average citizen doesn't blame the government for boosting meat prices by flooding the economy with too much money: he blames the butcher.

When the government tries to tell all the butchers and other businessmen what they can charge for their products and services—and what they can pay their workers—it takes on a staggering task. At last count there were something like 12 million business enterprises scattered around these United States.

The enterprises vary widely in type and size. About three-fourths of them are proprietorships, owned lock, stock, and barrel by the entrepreneur. He gets all the profits, absorbs all the losses, and takes all the responsibilities. He is the business.

The average proprietor is a very small businessman; he may be the chap who owns the shoeshine stand in the office building lobby or the fellow who sells hot dogs from a pushcart at the corner. At any rate, he takes in about $25,000 a year and has a net profit of around $3,500.

How does he live on such a tiny take? He may not try to for very long. Proprietorships come and go, even as men's dreams. They are easy to set up; often nothing more is required than to start doing business. They disappear when the owner retires, dies, or finds he can't make a go of his enterprise.

Or a proprietor may decide to take on a partner. A friend or a neighbor may have money to invest, or maybe he knows how to boil a better hot dog. Partnerships are relatively rare. There are about 900,000 of them, compared with more than 9 million proprietorships. The average partnership is nonetheless much busier than the average proprietorship: it takes in more than $90,000 a year and has a net profit of close to $12,000.

The average is boosted by the fact that partnerships are popular among accountants, lawyers, and other professional men, and among businesses where skill and personality count for more than capital. A young accountant can get a start in his field by joining an established partner; the older man gains because he can give the new partner the less interesting work.

Partnerships also are common in finance; about half of the member firms of the New York Stock Exchange are partnerships. The view is that public confidence is enhanced by an impressive array of partners, since the public knows that each partner can be responsible for all of the partnership's debts—to the extent of losing his house, his car, and even his motorcycle. One of the largest partnerships is Brown Brothers Harriman & Co., a private bank with assets not far from $500 million.

A large drawback of both proprietorships and partnerships, from the businessman's standpoint, is the high degree of risk. Not every businessman is so enamored of his abilities and ideas that he is willing to gamble everything on them. Another problem is lack of continuity; if even a single partner dies the partnership is dissolved.

Enter the corporation. "A corporation," in the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, "is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law." Corporations often long outlive the men who set them up. Best of all, from the businessman's standpoint, he risks only what he puts into the corporation. What's his outside the corporation remains his, no matter what happens to the business.

At latest count there were nearly 1.8 million corporations in existence. On the average they were much bigger than proprietorships and partnerships. The average corporation takes in more than $1 million a year and has a net profit of nearly $50,000. Corporations naturally include the giants of industry, but they also include many small enterprises: in one recent year 276,000 corporations had annual sales of less than $10,000.

Taxes help to explain the attraction of incorporation even to small businessmen. Proprietors and partners pay taxes

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the ALTERNATIVE November 1973

Felix Morley

From Robert A. Taft to Watergate

It is now a little over twenty-one years since Senator Robert A. Taft failed in his third and final effort to obtain the Republican nomination for the presidency. So, for all not yet beyond college age, this occurrence may quite reasonably be seen as part of the insignificant trivia in American history. Actually, however, the choice of Eisenhower over Taft, at Chicago on July 10, 1952, was a major milestone on the long road of our political evolution.

Bob Taft was frequently called "Mr. Republican," a title chosen for the recent solid biography of him by Professor James T. Patterson (reviewed elsewhere in this issue). That this is a misnomer is demonstrated by that party's triple repudiation of his leadership, at the GOP nominating conventions of 1940, 1948, and 1952. In the first two of these Willkie and then Dewey were chosen as the unsuccessful Republican standard-bearers. On his last essay Taft was outmaneuvered by Ike's lieutenants and then submerged by the "father image" of the popular war hero. Not much more than a year later, "Mr. Republican" was dead, of disappointment many thought.

"Taft can't win" was the parrot cry within his own party, which really sank the Ohio Senator. It is timely now to reflect on the validity and the value of that reiterated assertion. Certainly it turned the Republican Party away from any considered philosophy of government and towards a dubious opportunism which has reached its natural climax in all that Watergate implies. The magnitude of this change was not apparent under Eisnehower, an honest apolitical figure who essentially marked time in office. Nor did the alteration surface in the disastrous Goldwater campaign. But with Nixon, matured under Eisenhower, but more intelligent and less principled than his sponsor, the turn away from Taft's unflinching political morality became pronounced. Whether this rectitude can be restored will be the underlying issue in choosing the Republican nominee in 1976.

Taft was bitterly, indeed viciously attacked by the leadership of organized labor for his effective role in passage, over Truman's veto, of the Taft-Hartley, so-called "Slave Labor," Act. But this did not endear him to doctrinaire "conservatives" because he so resolutely refused to accept that classification. He even doubted the applicability of conservative thought to American politics, because of the essentially revolutionary principles of our Constitution. In several discussions on the subject which I had with him the Senator argued that conservatism, in party government, is necessarily linked to some element in the population which is legally privileged and wishes to remain so. In European and Latin-American countries these elements have usually been the landed aristocracy, the church, or the military, sometimes all three linked together. In this country there is no established church, no artificial nobility and, since the defeat of the Confederacy, no landed aristocracy. The military, fortunately, have never attempted to raise a Napoleon, though the electorate often shows a weakness for much-publicized generals.

Are there any other elements in which an assertively Conservative Party might root? Big Business is certainly conservative, in the negative sense of opposing socialistic practice which it does not itself control. And for many radicals the GOP is quite simply the party of Big Business. Taft argued, however, that it is extremely difficult, in any democratic country, to build an enduring political machine primarily on business support. Any such attempt is certain to arouse the antagonism of labor and probably agriculture, which with the secret ballot can always cast a majority of votes. Moreover, business, so long as it remains competitive, will never exhibit lasting political solidarity. It is subject to many cross currents, such as the conflicting positions of free-traders and protectionists.

Bob Taft, certainly, was never under the thumb of business or any other organized interest and, sadly, this seems to have been his chief political weakness. Yet he was a strong party man, taking his Republicanism very seriously, and perhaps the most influential party leader the Senate has ever seen. To my mind there are still some important reasons why a Republican of such eminence could not and would not be called conservative, and why he was indeed denounced by some as socialistic because he believed that a country as rich as ours should give moderate support to public education, public housing, and other welfare measures.

Conservative thinking, of course, has many fine attributes. The phrase *noblesse oblige* is still meaningful for the remnants of European aristocracy. But in the United States, where social eminence and material wealth are so closely equated, less chivalrous characteristics tend to dominate. One that is obvious is a rather craven fear of change, usually connected with personal anxiety about a threatened position or possession. This trait is by no means confined to the Upper Crust. An immigrant construction worker, eager to keep Negroes from diluting his tightly organized union, can in his limited field be just as conservative as any Wall Street tycoon. Indeed, the more recent the acquisition of status the more pronounced the antagonism to its disturbance is likely to be.

This fear of change necessarily implies great faith in restrictive authority, even in police surveillance, to maintain the status quo. Where there is no firmly established church, keeping parishioners in the station to which God is said to have called them, the less mystical substitute of "law and order" must be invoked. So the American conservative, despite his loud disclaimers, is actually a believer in strong government, meaning in this country strongly centralized government. In this instinctive reliance on governmental authority the conservative is curiously akin to the communist, who likewise considers it entirely proper to prevent change by the use of force. This probably explains why

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former communists, disillusioned with the way they run the show in Russia, have been disproportionately active in the more malleable American conservative movement.

Still another characteristic of conservatism is its belief in an elite and a consequent mistrust of democratic procedure. In America, where there is no birthright elite, this assumption of superiority may take curious and often highly arrogant forms. It is the half-educated conservative who displays a bumper-sticker saying: "America, Love It or Leave It." Xenophobic belief in "The American Century" is now happily at a discount. But the true-blue conservative still considers massive expenditures on "defense" as being somehow less socialistic than parallel governmental outlays in the field of domestic welfare.

To all this *mélange* of fundamentally emotional characteristics Bob Taft was both instinctively and intellectually opposed. He fully realized that while a mania for security promotes dictatorship it consequently damages the cause of liberty. He was, therefore, no conservative but rather an outstanding exponent of that classical liberalism which James Madison, above all others, embedded in our sadly neglected Constitution. Like Madison, Taft opposed all arbitrary power, which is endorsed, often with striking similarities, by both Conservatives and Socialists. In this country the latter have cleverly captured the label of Liberal, so there is no longer any distinctive name to clarify the philosophy of political balance which Taft espoused. Libertarian is a clumsy word. Constitutionalist will scarcely serve for an electorate where the vast majority have never even read our organic law. Old Whig, preferred by F. A. Hayek in his discerning essay on "Why I Am Not A Conservative," requires historical knowledge possessed by few Americans.

There is, however, great and perhaps unrealized significance in the fact that Bob Taft's political courage and transcendant honesty for a time made him generally known as "Mr. Republican." Almost he gave to that party not only the skillful leadership but also the spiritual magnitude that it had in Lincoln's day. And then, in a few short years, it plunged to Watergate.

The essential meaning of that catastrophe is not obscured by the ocean of publicity aroused. An able and dynamic Republican President, virtually certain of easy reelection, nevertheless permitted the most unsavory tactics by his entourage in order to secure a *Ja* vote of National Socialist proportions. Whether Mr. Nixon was personally cognizant of all the illegalities and "dirty tricks" involved is really a secondary matter. He cannot escape the ultimate responsibility, nor the fact that those guilty were the type of henchmen he wanted. It is a tragedy in the antique Grecian mold. Consumed by *hubris* a smooth and competent politician has irretrievably ruined his claim to veneration. And there is no salvation from his present purgatory. That miniature flag in the buttonhole is too closely akin to Hitler's omnipresent swastika; too reminiscent of Dr. Johnson's biting reminder that "patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel."

To this black cloud, however, there is a silver lining. For forty years now a few old-timers like myself have apprehensively watched the rapid enlargement of presidential power and the subordination of legislative, judicial, and local autonomy by self-serving claims of national security and executive privilege. Now we see a rising generation happily recalling that under our system, as the Federalist Papers amply prove, political powers were separated precisely because they could be checked and balanced against each other. A serious trauma is to be expected as the unused brakes are belatedly applied to executive arrogance. It was highly disagreeable for Aesop's bullfrog when he found that he could not inflate himself to the size of an ox. But with the reduction of executive pretensions should come, quite quickly, that restoration of balance on which our federal system depends, along with that individual initiative which authentic liberalism has always served to promote.

There is further cause for optimism in the fact that so many nominal conservatives pointedly divorced themselves from Mr. Nixon's untenably defensive posture, finding it "inoperative" as the charming euphemism of Mr. Ziegler has it. The trouble with our conservative thinking is not that it is dishonest or insincere, but simply that it is inapplicable, as a reasoned political philosophy, for the United States. In their efforts to establish privilege for the presidency, to make it a monarchistic office, both Alexander Hamilton and John Adams failed. So, well over a century later and partly because of Taft's opposition, did FDR, a superficial Democrat with many conservative traits. Where men of such great and varied talents could not undermine the federal balance it was unlikely that the Nixon-Agnew combine would succeed.

And thus we come back to Robert A. Taft, a man of the center who could not be drawn into pitfalls on either right or left. Justice was everything to him; privilege nothing. He was opposed to militarism because he knew it for an open door to national socialism. But he was equally opposed to all other forms of plausible coercion. Here was a man of virtue, in the strict Roman sense of that fine word, disproving the sorry legend that to be a politician is to be tarnished. His party realized this and therefore proudly called him "Mr. Republican"—even as pusilanimous leadership cut him down.

Watergate is no mere summer storm. Its final effect on persons and politics cannot yet be foretold. But with confidence one may predict that the next Republican candidate for the presidency will be much more in the character of Bob Taft than is the present incumbent. □

Patrick Cosgrave

The Mind of Toryism

American friends continually ask me why it is that the political climate of British Conservatism seems much more amenable to the intellectual and intellectual activity than does the climate of American Republicanism. There are, I think, many reasons, most of them arising from British history: not all of them, however much Americans may envy the success of the Conservative Bow Group compared to the (relative) failure of the Ripon Society, are conducive to Conservatism considered as a coherent philosophy having a distinct relevance to modern political problems. But, before proceeding to those reasons, it is important to grasp something quite fundamental about the intellectual (defined now as somebody who is especially concerned with the contribution which can be made to politics by the independent activity of mental analysis) who is predisposed towards Conservatism, and his equivalent who is drawn to Socialism or any of the other creeds of the Left. The left-wing mind is ameliorative and particularly disposed to attack; it is optimistic by nature. The Conservative mind is historical (though to a degree ameliorative) and defensive; it is pessimistic by nature. Stanley Baldwin, one of the most electorally successful of British Conservative Prime Ministers, once observed that "the difference between a man of intellect and an intellectual is the same as the difference between a gentleman and a gent." He meant by that remark not to scorn the assistance all intellectuals might give to the Party, but to make a distinction between Conservative gentlemen of intellect and left-wing intellectuals.

Now, this is not a frivolous distinction—indeed, it is an essential one. For the causes of a man being attracted to one stream of politics or another are not frivolous causes, even if they are instinctive. Whatever about the other activities of the mind, a marked feature of politics is this—that intellectual activity is imposed on tendency and experience. As perhaps our best-known British Conservative politician, Enoch Powell, has said, "Only in politics does personal experience make up so large a part of the material used to form judgments." Now, we can well argue that the left-wing thinker is fundamentally

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emotional in his judgments; but an essential part of the form of those judgments is their pretense to a *continuing* moral and intellectual justification. The left-winger is not interested in discovering why his policies go wrong; nor is he interested in discovering and coming to terms with the obstacles which real life may put in the path of his ambition. The Conservative, on the other hand, because he recognizes the impulse which drew him to his faith as an impulse, is the better prepared to recognize what is, and what, therefore, he must come to terms with. The left-wing intellectual compared to the Conservative is like the bright and enthusiastic undergraduate compared to the mature scholar. The former recognizes only his own insight; the latter such reality as his capacity allows him to perceive.

I fancy this proem may be of some interest to Americans as suggesting that way in which a British Tory approaches these problems. I will add only one other word about the experiences of the two countries. It seems to me that American Conservatives are excessively mechanistic. There is more about them of the *esprit de géometrie* than of the *esprit de finesse*, which we like to think characterizes ourselves. I know that saying this is to tread on dangerous ground, because it allows the American Conservative to retort with the accusation that his British equivalent is a time-server and a compromiser: I can only say that, in a moment, I will make that charge myself with more force than an American ever could, about some of my friends and contemporaries. But in dealing, let us say, with Soviet Russia, most American Conservatives I have read study the doctrinal challenge; most British Conservatives look at the power of Russia. Were Russia governed by angels, as Sir Herbert Butterfield once said, she would be a threat, because she is powerful. But there is an enormous practical difference between the way you tackle a doctrine, and the way you tackle a power: British Conservatives are more nationalistic for everybody than are Americans.

Even if it is risking a little, I will suggest that, whereas American Conservatives, like all Americans, think of America as an idea, British Conservatives think of Britain as an interest, an interest formulated as a nation. Conservatives also, of course, tend to be Christians, and defenders of established institutions. But perhaps the greatest of all British Conservative intellectuals, the third Marquis of Salisbury, Prime Minister for longer than Gladstone, probably the finest mind of the nineteenth century, once said that, although he was a most devout Christian, he had the interests of the nation in his charge and therefore, by the Christian law of duty itself he was obliged to place that interest "in front of all others he might have to consider."

The presence in our British political history of such figures as Salisbury; the fact that the Tory Party traces its history back to a seventeenth century intellectual and philosopher, Bolingbroke; the fact that one of the requirements of a parliamentary system of government such as we enjoy, in which the proponents of either party are required to excel in the cut and thrust of debate across a small chamber—a cut and thrust in which the younger Pitt defeated the great Fox; the fact that we are

Enoch Powell
from the *London Spectator*

a small and close knit society—all these things explain in part the exceptional tolerance which the British Conservative Party, unlike similar parties in other countries, affords to active political intelligence. (I say active political intelligence because there are many countries—Guatemala, for example, China, and Argentina, where Conservative administrations have respected and valued great artistic intelligence, which is something left-wing regimes never do, but do not invite the contribution of the speculative and analytical mind to political debate.)

However, it does not follow that the active political intelligences encouraged by the Conservative Party were—or are—always themselves Conservative. To follow the sense in which they might not be requires a brief historical survey. The Conservative Party in Britain has been in power for the greater part of British history since the Restoration, in one identifiable form or another. It has outlived all other parties, save Labour, and a possibly reviving Liberal rump. On its course through the history of the country it has acquired many accretions—the failed, the disappointed, the discontented, the dissatisfied—of other parties. It acquired the Whig landowners when the Whig Party was taken over by thrusting Liberal industrialists. It acquired some of those very industrialists when, softened by time into regard for rather more than personal gain they, with their leader Joseph Chamberlain, passed into the Tory ranks over the Irish question, thus adding to the Tories a distinctive element of economic liberalism (pioneered, admittedly, in Tory circles by Peel, when he attempted to repeal the protectionist Corn Laws) the most distinguished representative of which today is Enoch Powell. In the process of digesting Lloyd George after the First World War the Tories added to the populist tradition first mooted in their circles by Lord Randolph Churchill something of the magic of the Welsh Wizard. Labour came to power in the twenties very much, as Mr. Maurice Cowling in *The Impact of Labour* has shown, against the will of Tories, but with the goodwill of their leader, Stanley Baldwin, who thought education in power would lead Socialists away from revolution: he was proved right when a number of the most prominent Labour ministers joined him in a coalition government to save the nation in 1929. Thus, not merely did the Tory Party, through its survival at the helm of the nation for so many centuries, acquire many of the characteristics of the nation itself, notably a respect for education and intelligence (the influence of British academic education, and particularly the classical curriculum, on imperial politics in the nineteenth century, though it has drawn many fine scholars, is still underexplored); but the *detriti* which the party attracted to itself brought with them many pearls from other intellectual traditions.

This mixture of heritages, rather than the kind of psychological analysis favoured by William James, seems to me to explain much about the character of the modern Conservative Party. James divided Conservatives into tender-minded and tough-minded. Salisbury was tough, Baldwin tender. Now, when Labour scored its massive victory over the Tories in 1945, the instant Conservative reaction was to feel they had lost the center of politics; to feel the desire to reestablish intellectual respectability. Robert Blake, the biographer of the great Tory leader of the nineteenth century, Disraeli, the Provost of the Queen's College Oxford, and enobled by Edward Heath, said of the 1945-51 period, when Churchill gave Lord Butler the task of reestablishing Conservative intellectual ascendancy, and charge of the people Butler hired, that they were people "of whom many things have been said, but not that they are stupid. The Labour Party had lost its near monopoly of intellect and ideas."

In Butler's revivification of the Conservative Research Department (a body of bright young men and women serving the whole party, but especially the leadership, with ideas, and founded by Neville Chamberlain) there was, then, a distinctive tactical element: intellectualism was supported by the Party both because it was thought to be important in terms of power, and because the particular postwar brand on view drew Toryism towards the center, made it socially conscious, made it tender, as Baldwin had made it. Intellectualism was very important in terms of power largely because of the smallness and homogeneity of our island, which made the media vital in most propagations of ideas. A parliamentary group, the One Nation Group, was later formed, containing three of the most brilliant of the Research Department's graduates, Iain Macleod, later Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald Maudling, likewise, and

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Enoch Powell, who needs no introduction, and who was dismissed from the Shadow Cabinet by Edward Heath in 1968 for a particularly hard-line speech on immigration: it was designed to advance Tory thinking on social welfare matters, and adapt the Labour inheritance of the Welfare State to Tory uses. Later still the Bow Group was created: this was an organization designed, though as a research outfit rather than a pressure group, to bring Toryism into touch with the best of modern and generally liberal thinking without sacrificing the best traditions of the Party. All of these enterprises were smiled upon benignly by the Party leaders. It was scarcely noticed that, throughout the fifties and the sixties the national crisis, mainly in economics—or most obviously in economics—became worse and worse with each stage of play. Gradually, with the loss of the empire, with the cultivation of intellectualism, with the attempt to win the center, Toryism lost distinction of character. It did not necessarily follow, of course, that the Party could not continue to serve the nation—who ever knows what a nation's true interests are?—but it did mean that that service, considered deliberately as something distinct and definite—as an interest—no longer took the foremost position in Conservative intellectual thinking. It might almost be said that the Tories welcomed the intellectuals, not because they might contribute to the Party, but because the Party might contribute to them. Hence my initial distinction between different kinds of minds. Conservatives, frightened by the terrible experience of their defeat in 1945, sought power at almost all respectable cost. They began to conceive of their history in terms of success at power. And they forgot that probably their most successful leader, Salisbury, had said, in the *Quarterly Review* of July, 1860, that Tories ought not to think simply of office for such a concern was "a degrading error which has squandered the fair fame of parties and made a byword of the honour of public men."

Throughout the fifties and early sixties the most emotional and passionate debates in British Conservatism were about the loss of empire, the foreign policy role of the country, and Europe. Only gradually, in the sixties, did economic matters begin to ascend to paramountcy. The foreign policy debate never attracted very much of the attention of the best minds on the Right: it spawned another pressure group, the Monday Club, which rapidly developed an emphasis on anti-Communism, support for the white nations of Africa, and the prevention of colored immigration. For a brief moment, in the wake of Powell's taking up the last subject, the club enjoyed prominence, but it has been in decline for some time, rapidly losing influence at the heights, and suffering terrible division at the grass roots. Broadly speaking, the economic policy division between the Labour and Tory Parties in the sixties consisted of the one leaning towards socialized industry and the other against. Only with the failure of the Wilson government, and the subsequent, at least temporary failure of the Heath government, did the possibility of a serious debate about the economic organization of the country become possible; and only for a very brief time indeed did the leadership of the Conservative Party afford much tolerance for Tory intellectuals on the Right —or old-fashioned liberal—side of this argument. Indeed, such Tories as are on this side draw much more sustenance from Americans like Friedman than from anyone at home.

When he became leader of the Tory Party Edward Heath gave a good run to economic liberalism and the ethic of free enterprise. But in power he developed economic management in the direction of controls and administration. This was in part the reflection of his desire to enter Europe, and his awareness of the fact that, in the Community, it would be desirable to develop British industry by fostering cross-border mergers: this need, in turn, dictated a stress on management, bureaucratic control, and government supervision. Ineluctably, he was led back to the government intervention popular in the fifties and sixties, but at a much higher pitch. Some of those who opposed him were themselves pro-EEC; but they believed that free enterprise economics offered the best guarantee of British success inside the Community.

But the most important foci of what American Conservatives would think of as Conservative economic policy in a true sense—competitive, monetarist, and concerned to reduce the power of the state—are not within the Tory Party (save insofar as they are represented by the staff at Swinton Conservative College, which enjoys a considerable measure of autonomy from the leadership: it was a gift from the late Earl of Swinton). The Institute of Economic Affairs is the most important propagandist of micro-economic and Friedmanite ideas. The contribution of the Monday Club is negligible; and the so-called Economic Group of bright Tory members of Parliament has yet to develop its influence.

But that is to look at Conservatism as a doctrine. Historically, the Conservative Party of Edward Heath is far from out of tune with what has been stood for in the past. Most notably on the question of entry into Europe, Heath has defied the wishes of the country, and of the majority of the Party: he has been elitist in the true sense that the Conservative Party has always been elitist and anti-democratic. Salisbury always fought for the "political predominance of the educated classes" and they, in the great majority, have supported entry into Europe, even where they admit or even desire the likely disappearance of the nation as Europe unites further.

The great difference to this fragmented debate has been made by Powell. He is an economic liberal, a Friedmanite. He is also a die hard nationalist. He is also a democrat, believing, as is most evident in his stands against Europe and immigration, that the people of the nation as a whole have a right to determine their future as they wish. As I write this piece, moreover, Powell has just made a

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major speech on economic policy in which he attacks the system of economic controls which Heath has established; calls for more responsibility in the control of public expenditure, and the imposition of extra taxation until the desired anti-inflationary effect is achieved. Whatever his ultimate success will be no one can tell: but he does represent the return of the tough Conservative, in that his economic policies will require the abandonment of much of the tender, paternalistic policies adopted by both parties since the war. He is also the repository of the liberal economic heritage of the nineteenth century—stressing free enterprise and the intimate interconnection between freedom and economic freedom—in the Tory Party. But over and above all this he is a nationalist; and I believe that nationalism is the most important characteristic of British Conservatism. Since he is also a democrat, he defies the paternalistic heritage of Salisbury, though he is intellectually a very similar kind of politician. The battle between his ideas and those of Heath will determine the future of British Conservatism, and probably of the country. The likely permutations of that battle need to be worked out elsewhere—the chances of politics and the likelihood of success for either side require separate consideration—but the point to grasp now is that Powell, virtually alone, has created such debate about Conservatism, such distinctively intellectual Conservative debate. Compared to his effort, the Bow Group, such youth ginger groups as Pressure for Economic and Social Toryism, are insignificant. □

Income and Equality

In the course of George McGovern's abortive quest for the presidency, the Senator advanced a set of proposed tax reforms which, he asserted, would have high priority in a McGovern Administration. Besides closing what he called "unfair" tax loopholes for the rich, McGovern wanted to tax annual income over $50,000 at a rate of at least 75 percent, and sought a 100 percent confiscatory tax on any inheritance over $500,000. These reforms, argued McGovern, would not only yield a "fairer" tax system, but would also promote a "more equitable" distribution of income in America.

McGovern's tax package immediately came under a lot of fire, in large part because many people found the abovementioned figures unreasonable. Even those commentators essentially sympathetic to the candidate's aims felt that he had misjudged the feelings of most Americans in this area. McGovern himself was alternately bemused and befuddled by all the furor: at one point he expressed perfect amazement that many of the assembly line workers he talked to thought *his* tax package "unfair," at least for people making more than $50,000 a year. (Apparently, the Senator felt such views represented a gross misreading of one's class interest.) In any event, McGovern soon started backtracking on his ideas while Republicans rejoiced at yet another blunder, McGovernites cursed yet another example of the "backwardness" of the American people, and historians added yet another cubit to McGovern's stature as the most naive man to run for the presidency since William Jennings Bryan.

This episode, however, is more than just a commentary on the lack of strategic brilliance exhibited by the 1972 Democratic nominee for president. It strikes me as having considerable substantive interest as well, for two reasons. First, the fact that large numbers of individuals in intellectual and academic circles wholeheartedly accepted and supported McGovern's ideas *in toto*. Second, the fact that those who did criticize the candidate attacked his specific figures, and not the more general idea that income needed to be redistributed. Apparently, that goal itself is no longer at all controversial in liberal circles; or to state the matter somewhat differently, the belief that the current distribution of income in America is somehow "bad" and "inequitable" is ceasing to be a radical idea and is becoming instead part of mainstream liberal doctrine.

One wonders, of course, why this should be the case—and this in turn raises a whole series of other questions. Has income distribution in America become less equal? Can one specify what would constitute a "just" or "equitable" distribution of income? And finally, what posture should public policy take toward this increasing criticism of current income distribution?

The first question is difficult to answer with any statistical certainty; however, there are clear indications that income in this country is continuing a long historical trend of becoming more evenly distributed. Two of the more interesting of these indications are presented by B. Bruce-Briggs and Irving Kristol. Briggs, in a recent article for the *Public Interest*, points out that the *only* type of housing whose cost is rising relative to income is in upper-middle-class areas—because more Americans are becoming bunched in the middle income ranges where they can begin to bid on such housing, hence driving up the price. Kristol discusses the same phenomenon in more general terms in an article for the *Wall Street Journal* entitled "The Frustrations of Affluence." According to Kristol, technology has made many things much cheaper in this country, thus bringing an improved standard of living within range of an increasing number of people. What frustrates the affluent, then, is the difficulty, in this increasingly egalitarian society, of purchasing those "distinctions" that the upper 15 percent of the income strata used to be able to command automatically—e.g., a live-in maid, or a summer home on the Cape. In Kristol's words, "A hundred years ago, it took a relatively small amount of money to make a person much better off. Today, it takes substantial amounts of money to make a person (above the working-class level) only a little better off. The reason is that middle-class people now have to compete with working-class and lower-middle-class people for those 'good things in life' they had always aspired to."

Conceivably, one could disagree with the above arguments; nevertheless, it would still strike me as an extraordinarily difficult proposition to assert that income in America has become less equal in the last century. Kristol, in an article in *Commentary* called "About Equality," has eloquently addressed this point as well: "Inequality of income is *no greater today than it was twenty* years ago, and is certainly less than it was fifty years ago. . . . Though there has been a mushrooming of polemics against the inequalities of the American condition, most of this socioeconomic literature is shot through with disingenuousness, sophistry, and unscrupulous statistical maneuvering. As Professor Seymour Martin Lipset has demonstrated, by almost any socioeconomic indicator one would select, American society is as best we can determine *more* equal than it was one hundred years ago. Yet, one hundred years ago most Americans were boasting of the historically unprecedented equality that was to be found in their nation, whereas today many seem convinced that inequality is at best a problem and at worst an intolerable scandal."

If income has *not* been getting more

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unequal, we are back where we started —wondering why so many people have become convinced that inequality of income is now a problem. Is it perhaps because some new, morally compelling standard has been formulated which spells out, in keeping with the sympathies of our more enlightened age, what should constitute a just distribution of income? If someone has drawn up such a standard, I have been unable to locate it. Kristol states that the *Public Interest* (which he edits) has been trying for some time to get one of the critics of income distribution in America to write an article attempting to define a "just" distribution of income. Kristol further states that no one will write this article for him. One begins to suspect that the people who are so critical of the existing distribution of income in this country really have little idea of what they would like to see in its place. And one begins to suspect as well that their dissatisfaction must reflect something other than mere disapproval of the way income statistics read in U.S. Census reports.

What it does reflect is quite fascinating. Kristol argues persuasively that those who are most critical of income distribution in the United States—whom one could broadly and loosely categorize as intellectuals—are in reality engaged in a class struggle with the business community for status and power. But this struggle does not reflect mere power lust; rather, it expresses a genuine dislike for bourgeois, commercial society, with its belief that personal security, personal liberty, and the opportunity for steadily increasing material prosperity constitute the essential elements of the common good. To the American liberal intellectual, such a crass, mundane, self-centered formulation of the philosophic basis of a society will never appear morally sufficient or be personally satisfying. A society founded on such a basis will accordingly be viewed as illegitimate. And if such is one's view of a society, he will see everywhere the signs of that illegitimacy.

It follows, then, that almost no conceivable redistribution of income will satisfy those who criticize America most severely in this area. For the problem is not really income at all. On the contrary, income seems to be getting more equal, and those who criticize the current distribution are unable to formulate what *would* constitute a just distribution in any event. The problem is rooted instead in a basic disagreement over the philosophical basis of a good society.

No doubt, America's most vocal social critics would prefer a more heroic, selfless, inspiring vision of the common good than that which prevails in western bourgeois democracies. Such visions, one might point out, are precisely what is venerated in the worker's paradises of Russia, China, and Eastern Europe. And not surprisingly, a number of American academics have returned from visits to these countries with glowing reports of happiness and collective progress.

I suppose this concern for heroics and inspiration is fine if one wants to indulge it. But most of us are considerably more impressed with the fact that the "crass, mundane, and self-centered" bourgeois society of America has yielded the highest *and* the most equally distributed standard of living in history. Some of us would even go so far as to argue that the equally unique degree of personal freedom in this country is actually a rather heroic thing for a society to achieve.

Granted, improvements can be made. Few would argue that opportunity is completely equal, and few would quarrel with some redistribution of income as prerequisite to assisting the most needy elements of our society. But to argue, as did many supporters of the sage from South Dakota, that the current distribution of income in America is somehow "evil" is patently absurd. In truth, as we have seen, this is an indictment less of income distribution than of the philosophical basis of American society. There is a perfect right to make such accusations (though one might hope for more intellectual honesty on the part of the accusers). But public policy, unless it is suicidal, has an equal right (and indeed, an obligation) to dismiss them. □

Thomas Molnar

The Inarticulate Society of the Future

Even while they protest every aspect of the industrial-consumer society, the new scientists of futurology imperturbably describe the society of the twenty-first century in ways not essentially different from ours today. Although they call for boldness of imagination, futurologues usually do not think beyond the known and the familiar; they merely enlarge the size and swell the statistics of the present. The "bigger" and the "better" seem to form the horizon of their predictions.

Concrete observation ought to come, I think, to the aid of imagination when we speak of the future. And, of course, no cause is served when we speak of the entire planet as having *one* kind of future, that is, when we are carried away by the contemporary yet provincial thinking of the West. It may be forgivable when western futurologues try gently to impose their own vision on the rest of mankind, but it is obvious that the rest of the world has its own traditions, and that the passing of years and decades will remove rather than thicken the recently added layer of western usages and institutions.

In comparison with third world societies, what was the nature of this "added layer"? And more generally, what is specifically "western" (from the point of view of a phenomenological analysis of political life and institutions) in the West over against the societies of the third world and also the modern communist societies? A brief answer can only state that western ideas have created an *articulated* society, whereas the more traditional societies (archaic, tribal, sacral, the oriental despotisms, etc.) have been relatively *undifferentiated.* It is only in the West that one may speak of society as not coincident entirely with the state; of spiritual and temporal power; of government, institutions, and church; of governing and opposition parties; of distinct yet interconnecting social classes and so on. Let us call societies where several of these phenomena exist *articulated,* and let us note—here only very summarily—that most nonwestern societies, together with archaic ones, did not allow themselves to be so divided or internally differentiated; they did not allow, for example, the existence of a free intellectual community whose ideas and concepts would interact with the ideas and concepts of the spiritual and temporal power, thus influencing the structure of institutions. Even in the culturally brilliant medieval Islamic world, the philosophers were limited to speculation within their profession, and the state never had recourse to their ideas. Nor did the official religious establishment.

Now the point I wish to raise after these few preliminaries is whether an intellectually honest futurology ought not to imagine our various societies as going towards new forms of inarticulateness? Let us distinguish three spheres in the world today which, it seems to me, are tending centrifugally *away from* the articulate (western) model of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The three spheres are the western world proper, the communist countries, and the third world. In other words, I do not wish to step out of the presently existing general frame of reference. And the reason why I speak of the nineteenth and twentieth century "model" is that these 200 years saw western concepts of politics and government penetrate the third world (colonialism) and the empires of Russia and China (Marxism). This period was the apogee of western influence, and when the futurologues show themselves so optimistic regarding the future world soci-

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ety as modeled after the West, they seem to me narrowly tied to what has been familiar to them. I repeat, however, that we have every reason to think that the world is not tending *towards* a more complete imitation of the western model, but away from it. And so does the western world itself.

Let us begin our short analysis with the latter. The "articulate" institutional life is more than just contested today, it is simply not believed. Just as the foundation myths of some archaic societies suffer a kind of wear with the passing of time, the institutions and the principles on which they stand have withered away to a large extent in the West. After 1968 Raymond Aron summed it up by saying that the old authority is agonizing, the new authority has not emerged yet. Paul Ricoeur, of a different ideological persuasion from Aron, is also of the opinion that we witness an exhaustion of meaning (*épuisement de sens*), leading to two mutually supporting phenomena: an absence of any collective project and savage, uncontrollable social experimentation, too rapid and unorganized to bring about new institutions. Yet, Ricoeur does believe that future society will be even more complicated than today's, but whether it will find its "*médiateurs sociaux*" (Aron's "new authorities"), he cannot say.

It is obvious that if we were to list the half-dozen or so assumptions on which western political life has rested from Socrates to Cicero to Jesus and Augustine, we would see their "*épuisement*," which is translated into the way of life of the protesters. The latter are in fact the first to refuse to perform the ritual which perpetuates the political myth in any society, and society at large no longer believes the myth either and therefore fails to reaffirm its validity. Yet, it must be emphasized again that political life in the West has meant a vigorous institutional self-assertion, and this, in turn, means separation *and* harmonization of interests in a socio-political milieu where tension and conflict are recognized as parts of the human condition. As Ricoeur remarks, conflicts today are not allowed to ripen, conciliation at once is sought, so that on the one hand there remains a lot of unfinished business superficially papered over by slogans, and on the other hand a similarly impatient experimentation external to society and its institutions.

The western world is thus moving towards an increasingly complex social life which will be unable to express itself in institutions. Political life, consequently, may become increasingly rudimentary, not in the direction of a vanishing point desired by anarchists, but in the direction of brutalization. Aron's "new authority" may be totalitarian, once more invested with spiritual and temporal power and internalizing all the forces previously in creative tension.

This is the more possible, perhaps even probable, and models in extra-western societies will not be lacking. Let us bear in mind that unless we are adepts of historical evolutionism according to which the whole of mankind keeps approaching one universal form, we must be aware that the West has been an exception rather than the rule; there is no reason, indeed, to follow Hegel whose historical itinerary of freedom led from the Orient to the Occident (and stopped in Prussia), and not assume that history may again move from the West to the East or South. Indeed, what do we see? Communism, a western offshoot, has adjusted itself to the monolithism of oriental despotisms, has even strengthened it by its own repugnance for political articulateness. Communist societies have eliminated politics in its western definition, and are now stabilizing themselves on a low level: even the previously articulated societies of Eastern

Europe are today "proletarian states" where action is concentrated in a few hands, while the undifferentiated mass is allowed an extremely reduced nonpolitical sphere of activity. Thus Hegel is proved wrong twice: history is not a triumphant chariot leading *by necessity* to freedom, it simply has no unilinear direction. It seems even that the attraction of communism for western minds is not the specific charm of Marxist doctrine, but rather an invitation to disarticulate our institutional existence and concentrate responsibility in a few all-powerful hands. The most unpopular orator at the recent Semaine Sociale (held in Rennes) was the representative of the *patronnat*, M. de Calan, who spoke in favor of socially conflictive situations, always solved and always reappearing in new forms, testing in the process both the individual and the vigor of institutions. He was unpopular, one must assume, because his audience, although hostile to institutions which "repress freedom," are ready to endow one superorganism, a sort of Teilhardian totalized head, with the faculty of collective thinking and decision-making.

The third world too takes an unexpected revenge on Hegel who had "condemned" Asia to oblivion and Africa to slumber. Consisting mostly of archaic societies, the countries of the third world are today the scenes of what may well be regarded as a pseudo-conflict: between the traditional structure which is tribal and sacral, and the need of modernization. The more they promote the methods of modernization and with it urbanization, the more evident become the effects of a desacralized existence. The next step is, as we see in an increasing number of cases, military dictatorship, replacing the tribal potentate's authority, on the one hand, and on the other hand, promoting a brutal nationalism as a substitute for the waning tribal cohesion. Here again, political power and action are concentrated in a few hands; the mass, even if it benefits by increased economic wellbeing, remains inert although usable as an occasional political tool.

As in the communist empire, the power in most third world countries also will be nonarticulated, not broken down into institutional forms, and therefore not promoting variety and plurality. The citizen's activity will consist in securing a higher standard of living and a modicum of freedom of criticism which, however, is not supposed to take public forms or endanger the regime. Thus he will remain essentially a private unit, without institutional modes of expression. This does not necessarily spell misery, and the private sphere may even be enlarged with time; but this minimum of contentment has nothing to do with centuries of western history during which the citizen was also a member of various units of power concentration and thus politically influential, free.

It is quite correct to call both what happened in communist societies and third world societies "revolution." A whole network of institutions has been abruptly eliminated or otherwise discredited, and all the underlying social myth with it. In the West the process is slower—precisely because of the previous articulation of political life, hence of a more varied, more plural resistence. In communist and third world countries the transition may be easier—because it is from one kind of quasi-monolithic society to another. The future form for both might perhaps be called *national communism* or *social nationalism*, a new label for a very ancient political reality which spread historically and geographically over the whole globe: from the Andes (Inca empire) to the Nile, from central Africa to China.

The line of the future is not necessarily running along these considerations, but one may be surprised that various futurologues have neglected these possibilities. As I said, they are adepts of some form of historical evolutionism, and are locked up in a speculative ghetto where certain forms of thought are regarded as tabu. Nevertheless, future historians may speak of western efforts to conquer ideologically the archaic societies and the various oriental despotisms—only to weaken themselves in the process, and eventually to succumb to a specific kind of loss of articulateness. If this were so—and symptoms are not lacking—then we would have to rethink historical speculation from G. Vico and Kant, Lessing, and Hegel, and see some validity in the various utopian societies from Thomas More to Sebastien Mercier and Marx which renounce individual freedom and institutional tension for the regulated, inarticulate society.

These considerations should not tempt us into believing that we have discovered new laws of historical development. If we reject the linear concept, we do not have to adopt the cyclical or, for that matter, the amorphous. We should only not exclude the unpopular possibilities. □

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The Nation's Pulse



by Victor Gold

Dateline Sans Souci

Quick, Steve, slip me a spyglass. A contact lens. Something. Because I can't believe my pollutionated eyeballs.

Did you see who just walked in? I mean, Jill St. John I could understand. Or Barbara Howar. After all, a single man—even if he's about to become Secretary of State—is entitled to his choice of female luncheon companions in a free, pluralistic society. Right, Steve?

But today, so help me Pax Americana, Henry has outdone himself in keeping dumb company in public. Not immoral or fattening company. Just dumb. I mean, *Norman Mailer*?

Of course, it's Henry's business, I guess. It's his private life to lead. Like, when Duane Thomas, the Redskin halfback, wouldn't stand at attention for the pre-game national anthem a few weeks back, that was his business. Right, son? All he owes the public is 100 percent performance between the sidelines. And all Henry owes us is an honest day's work that brings the country closer to that generation of peace his boss is always talking about. Right?

Wrong, Steve, wrong. That's why Henry's boss' favorite coach, George Allen, took Duane Superstar aside to tell him that when someone has a social contract with the public, even if it's purely commercial, there are certain Middle American conventions best honored in the observance, not the breach.

True, Allen's fan in the Oval Office hasn't been inclined to put wraps on his foreign policy superstar's unconventional off-duty conduct. Not that Henry doesn't stand at attention for all the important songs, like the anthem and "Hail to the Chief." It's just that he's been known to swing to the beat of a different drummer than the one who kept time for his predecessors.

Do you know what John Foster Dulles did to relax, Steve? He washed dishes with his wife. So you see how Jill and Barbara came as something of future shock to a lot of Middle Americans. Though Henry's coach probably takes the permissive but pragmatic view that any foreign policy field runner who could get him together with Leonid Breznev and Mao Tse-tung in a single election season is entitled to some off-duty privileges.

But Norman Mailer? Believe me, Steve, if they ever play this one in Peoria, George McGovern might get a recount yet.

Why? Not because Norman Mailer uses dirty words in books. That falls in the category of art. Some Middle Americans might not like it. But in addition to choosing the female luncheon companions he likes, a Secretary of State to-be has a right to hobnob with artists of his choice, dirty words notwithstanding.

No, Steve, what's wrong with that luncheon scene across the room is that the man responsible for this country's foreign policy is leaning over the linen in order not to miss the conversational pearls of the purveyor of as much conspiratorial gibberish in any eight-hour period as Robert Welch the Birchite ever emitted in his most fecund workday.

For that, son, is what Norman Mailer amounts to nowadays. Maybe he was an artist once. But today he's only a little man in literary tennis shoes, padding around the country, talk show-to-talk show, peddling inane political stories for profit.

Could he, for example, this very noon be filling in America's foremost international expert on his theory of how the CIA and FBI might have done away with Marilyn Monroe to embarrass Robert Kennedy? Or is he enlisting Henry into the counterespionage group he organized between drinks at his soft-bellied liberal chic birthday party not long ago? You remember: the private network that's going to spy on the CIA, FBI, IRS, and so forth.

Or possibly he's discussing neither of these plots, but only imparting to our next Secretary of State his theory as to why Esso changed its name to Exxon last year. Because, said Norman, it sounds like Nixon. And the man was serious when he said it.

Please, Henry, have mercy. Jill, Barbara, even Gloria, we can take. Or if you want to lunch with an obscenity-using World War II writer, why not try James Jones? But Norman Mail....Oh, my God, look who's picking up the check! On taxpayer's time, yet. Robert Welch, where are you now that we need you? □

Brudnoy's Film Index

■ **Dillinger**: The flip side of *Bonnie and Clyde*; enough spilled guts to stage your own war. G-man Melvin Purvis, with gloves and a hat, versus snazzy John D, in bullets. Moll thrown in for spice. Yuck.

■ **Hail to the Chief**: Last year it was *Hail*, maligning Our Chief Which Art in Washington, San Clemente, Key Biscayne, Camp David, and Peking. Reissued to coincide with the Watergate circus. Scabrous.

■ **Hitler: The Last Ten Days**: Seems like a fortnight, but Alec Guiness is magnificent. Hanna Arendt's "banality of evil" theme comes alive.

■ **Heavy Traffic**: Cartoon full-length feature; vulgar, cruel, cheeky, not for your Bambi and Dumbo crowd. Brilliantly drawn, viciously objectionable.

■ **Jesus Christ Superstar**: Story's familiar; good God-pop rock, a majestic set (Israel's deserts), a wee bit of camp (Herod's Song: "So you're Jesus Christ, the Great Jesus Christ/ Prove to me that you're no fool/Walk upon my swimming pool"); *I* loved it; I was alone. They're wrong.

■ **I Escaped from Devil's Island**: With Jim Brown. I rooted for the sadistic guards. Go to your room, Jim Brown, and take your macho with you.

■ **Last Tango in Paris**: Brando's rump; Schneider's everything; the film that gave Pauline Kael the giggly-bumps. A breakthrough? More a rip-off.

■ **The Mackintosh Man**: Paul Newman, Dominique Sanda, James Mason, respectively dreary, incomprehensible, and splendid. Plot? Oh yes, there probably is a plot. Something about espionage, diamonds, something like that. This leaves you (or at least it left me) wondering what the "I Love Lucy" rerun was like, the one I missed to go see this.

■ **O Lucky Man**: O not so lucky film-goer, and oh my aching backside —it runs for days. Lots of philosophy, duly disguised.

■ **State of Seige**: For professional Amerika-haters with no limits in endurance. Trashy and dull, propaganda to the last oozed drop.

■ **Visions of Eight**: Last year's Olympics, through eight directors' eyes. Less than two hours of mostly splendid photography; athletic grace, commercial smoothness, a tad repetitive. Directors Arthur Penn, Milos Forman, Claude Lelouch, John Schlesinger, Kon Ichikawa, Juri Ozerov, Michael Pfleghar, Mai Zetterling. A documentary that works.

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Chris Hughes

A Letter from Europe

Having grown up in Europe as a military brat during the late sixties, when a dollar was still what our own hordes of U.S. tourists used to call "real money"; when it was still financially feasible (and socially chic) to blitz Europe on $5 a day, or in assembly-line tours for quick lunch-counter intellectualizing; my recent return to Europe, as a college student, has brought me to a rude awakening. America is no longer regarded as the towering paragon of uncontested strength. To the contrary, our international credibility has now been seriously eroded, and our international stature and prestige have declined accordingly.

I left the United States for Europe in January of this year, after having worked in the national election for the Republican ticket. Nixon's overwhelming victory, I believed, apparently like many others, was a popular mandate to reverse the trend of the New Deal-Great Society philosophy which for so long had prevailed in Washington, D.C. But then the Watergate affair broke.

I have had to rely on European press coverage of the Watergate for most of my information, coverage which has not always illustrated a terribly astute awareness and understanding of our political process. Nonetheless, European attitudes and interpretations of this event are still very important because of the far-reaching implications which could develop in Euro-American relations.

In Paris, where I had been attending the Sorbonne University, one of France's most highly respected and widely read newspapers, *Le Figaro*, argued that the Watergate hearings have been turned into a Disneyland for lawyers and that those (Senators and committee staffers) who have allowed the hearings to flounder into ridiculousness are forgetting that not only is the President himself a lawyer, but that he is, in fact, one of the country's best. *Le Figaro* also defended the President's refusal to release the White House tapes *carte blanche*, and argued that without such privilege no government is possible. The newspaper further stated that "in standing fast he [Nixon] is defending the integrity of the Presidency itself. The time will come when the versatile American democracy will be grateful to him for this."

Although reaction elsewhere in Europe has not always been that abiding, Europeans are most concerned about what they feel has been a decline of confidence on the part of the American public in its leadership. England's liberal newspaper, *The Guardian*, expressed a fairly common European reaction to the Watergate hearings when it charged that the Watergate committee was somewhat reminiscent of the McCarthy hearings of the fifties. One of Europe's most conservative newspapers, Rome's *Il Tempo*, argued more provocatively and lashed out at Senator Ervin's committee, charging that the hearings seemed to be a colossal machination aimed at undermining both Nixon and Nixon policy. One of the most revealing observations on this issue, however, came from the German political weekly *Die Zeit*. Discussing what it called the decline in presidential power and a catharsis for the United States, *Die Zeit* also pointed out that probably no American administration will be interested in foreign policy to the extent of the Nixon Administration. Thus it concluded, "particularly for Europeans, the Nixon-Kissinger team is an optimum and is absolutely irreplaceable." Europe, in short, is concerned with the international implications emanating from Watergate.

1973 was designated the "Year of Europe" by the Nixon Administration. The United States and its European allies were expected to rejuvenate Europe's postwar Atlantic alliance system as a solid basis for the upcoming fall negotiations, on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe (MBFR), between the NATO countries, the Soviet Union, and its Warsaw Pact allies. But although some low-keyed transatlantic talks are underway between the United States and its European allies to establish a common front for the fall conference, the common political purpose of the West, as well as the social and economic compatibility of the United States and Europe, has been severely strained in recent months.

The European concern over present and future U.S. economic and defense policies has arisen because of two dollar devaluations in short succession, the continuing erratic behavior of the dollar on the international money exchanges (which is both a symptom and a cause of the uncertainty in Euro-American relations), as well as the imposition of agricultural export restrictions. Europeans reacted particularly sensitively to the agricultural embargo of soybeans and one French newspaper asserted that the embargo was deliberately aimed at Europe's Achilles' tendon (its lack of resources), to demonstrate U.S. power over Europe. If nothing else, the embargo did force the Europeans to realize that the Americans were not only willing to close down their market to them without warning, but that the Europeans themselves were to become the first victims of the newly established détente. A major factor in the scarcity of agricultural products, of course, had been the U.S. decision to sell grain and corn to the communist giants, irrespective of European needs and the traditional transatlantic ties.

Thus, there is unrest among the European nations. They are concerned about the weakness of the U.S. dollar, U.S. disregard for its allies, and the pace of Mr. Nixon's moves toward détente with the Soviets. Of particular concern for the Europeans is whether a "Watergate-weakened" White House can resist congressional pressures to unilaterally reduce U.S. troop strength in Europe.

Recent reports that the United States is about to announce formal diplomatic recognition of East Germany may not be surprising to the governments of Western Europe, but it has surprised many private citizens. Further, the United States' willingness to give the Soviets whatever help they need to stabilize their economy (which in turn permits the Soviets to channel their resources into the military realm), has also raised doubts in European minds about American reliability. These doubts have been further compounded by the recent report in *Jane's Fighting Ships*, the world's most authoritative annual study on the world's military navies. The 1972-73 edition of *Jane's* reported that the Soviet navy has made (and is continuing to make) "staggering advances," and that the U.S. navy has now been relegated to second position (to the Soviets) among the globe's naval powers—no slight task for what has been historically a landlocked bear.

These events have produced an assessment which is gaining increasing acceptance in Europe and which was recently expressed by the *London Daily Mail*. Arguing that the United States is sick of foreign wars and responsibilities, the *Daily Mail* commented: "More and more Americans are saying: What does it matter to us if the whole of Southeast Asia goes Communist? Is it worth risking a single GI for Cambodia? Will we live to hear Americans ask whether it is worth risking a single American life for Britain? . . . Now that the Watergate comedy show is switched off for a moment, you can just hear the Kremlin purring as it prepares to lap up the cream."

The impact of recent events has, then, not been lost on those who fear the possible "Finlandizing" of Western Europe. As one commentator in Europe observed: "'Finlandization' of Europe would (perhaps) mean no basic changes in the social order, but there would be no American troops in Europe and NATO would be dissolved. Western European governments would be so weak as a result that they would be forced to coordinate their foreign policies with the Kremlin. This is not a very promising prospect."

Although the President's calendar of events has not been firmly established yet, it is already quite clear that the President will be cautiously received in Europe. Unless very intensive preliminary work is done before Nixon's visit, the Administration's attempt to revitalize Euro-American relations and to produce some very tangible political returns, as well as trade and monetary reforms, could fall far short of its goal.

Unfortunately, not even these many

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events seem to startle the Europeans out of their atavistic resentment and mutual suspicions of each other. Thus the transatlantic alliance and the very nature of the international system is in question and, for the western alliance at least, there is need for serious misgivings. For the Europeans, therefore, Nixon's attempt to put Watergate behind him is being applauded so that he can direct his attention to these many problems. And, looking in from the outside, I too believe it would be wise to allow our judicial process to take over Watergate so that the country's leadership can direct its attention to issues which may well determine the course of future history. □



Is Watergate Behind Us?

(WASHINGTON)—Well, the August recess is over and the United States Congress is back in session. During the recess the President held what most political commentators considered to be two successful press conferences. The theme of these conferences was that Watergate is behind us and let's get on with the more pressing questions facing the country, including inflation, the energy shortage, and trade reform.

The Administration has come out fighting and the Republican Senate and House members have come back from their states and districts with the message that the American public is tired of the media extravaganza on Watergate. Though public opinion polls have yet to confirm this impression, it is apparent that Watergate is not going to take the toll on the Republican Party that many Democrats had hoped it would.

Watergate Impact Tested

A congressional by-election, to fill the vacant seat of Maryland Congressman William Mills (who committed suicide because of apparent financial irregularities in his 1972 campaign), was billed by the local press, including the *Washington Post*, as a case to test the impact of Watergate. But when GOP candidate Bob Bauman won the election in Maryland's First District, the press was noticeably quiet about the outcome.

Bauman won an extremely close race (27,248 to 26,001) against Maryland's senior Democratic state senator, Fred Malkus. As a founding member of Young Americans for Freedom and the American Conservative Union, Bauman won the reputation of being an eloquent and outstanding spokesman for conservative issues. Now an attorney and a senator, Bauman was once a page in the U.S. Congress, and later a staff counsel on the House Judiciary Committee. House Republicans are particularly pleased with Bauman's election and expect that his legislative knowledge will make a major contribution to the legislative process. He is expected to be both an aggressive and gutsy legislator and he looks as if he will fit in well with the new breed of congressman that is reflected in the ninety-third freshman class.

A GOP communications memo for the Republican congressional membership charged that the Maryland election would make an excellent case study for election reformers in Congress. The memo asserted that Maryland Democrats had used anonymous smear sheets, solicited openly absentee ballots with a massive mailing that violated federal law, and gave erroneous information on qualifications for absentee voting. It would appear that when it comes to winning, Watergate has yet to make its mark on the American political process.

House Voting Violations

It is also ironic, at a time when Watergate is supposed to have ushered in a new sense of morality into American politics, that House voting violations have reached a new height. Under the new electronic voting system in the U.S. House of Representatives it is very easy for a congressman to have his personal card placed in the computer terminal to register a vote in his absence. Members of Congress, however, may not vote by proxy (cf. No. 658 *Jefferson Manual And Rules Of The House Of Representatives*). In *Cannon's Precedents Of The House Of Representatives Of The United States* (p. 129) it is also explicitly stated that: "No man can transfer his vote or permit another Member to vote for him . . . A Member must vote in person."

These violations are of no small importance. Three recent bills—the Erlenborn (R-Ill.) amendment to hold down the minimum wage increase, Congressman Steve Symms' (R-Idaho) attempt to reduce the federal debt ceiling, and Phil Crane's (R-Ill.) proposal to legalize the ownership of gold—were all defeated by just one vote. One irate congressman, commenting on the widespread voting irregularities, said: "It only goes to show you that there's a double standard of morality in the U.S. Congress, but all the public hears about is Watergate. I'd like to know where all those investigative journalists we hear about are at?"

Vetoes Sustained

With Congress back in session House and Senate Democrats had hoped to gain the strength necessary to override the President's veto of S. 504, the Emergency Medical Services Act of 1973. In the Senate, as usual, there was no contest. The veto was overridden 77 to 16. But on the House side, the Administration was able to hold enough troops in line to sustain the veto by a roll call of 273 to 144—a bare margin of five votes. The following week the President's veto of the Fair Labor Standards Act Amendment (the minimum wage bill), H.R. 7935, was sustained by a more convincing vote, 259-164 (a margin of 23).

Although neither vote is indicative of overwhelming strength, the Administrations's message is clear—the Democrat-controlled Congress cannot afford to ignore the Executive.

Inactive Congress?

A debate which is gaining increasing popularity, but which really begs the issue, is whether Congress has been dragging its feet in the wake of Watergate. The Administration charges that Congress acts as though the President's popular election mandate has been voided by Watergate. Only 37 of 255 Administration-related bills have become law. House Democrats argue that more legislation has been passed in these first few months of the Ninety-third Congress than in any other similar period, but needless to say, there is no correlation between quantity and quality. The President has once again taken the initiative away from Congress by presenting a new State of the Union to the legislative branch covering a broad spectrum of legislative proposals. The theme is that the President will not allow Watergate to stalemate his authority.

"Creeping Creepism"

Meanwhile, many Republicans continue to feel dismay towards the Administration. A recent meeting at the White House between the President and a congressional delegation was designed to show growing congressional support for the Nixon Administration. One young Republican congressman left the meeting disgruntled, saying he had never liked pep rallies and this one was no exception. In his first syndicated column, John Lofton, former editor of the Republican National Committee's publication, *Monday*, and editorial advisor to the *New Guard*, captured this sentiment well in discussing Nixon's visit to

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New Orleans. Freshman GOP Congressman David Treen of Louisiana, who is the first Republican elected to national office from that state in 100 years, was the victim of what Lofton calls the White House's "creeping CREEPism." During his first major address in New Orleans since the Watergate revelations, President Nixon gave high individual praise to the Louisiana congressional delegation, but failed even to mention the Republican congressman by name. Call it ineptness, call it insensitivity (The Louisiana Republican State Chairman, Jimmy Boyce, was more direct, saying, I "told those silly bastards at the White House to tell the President that if he was going to mention the Democrats, mention Treen first."), this is one Republican administration that knows how to alienate its most loyal supporters.

Another indication of declining support for the GOP was a recent public opinion poll which indicated that only 23 percent of the American public now considers itself Republican, down 5 percent from the election, and at an all-time low. Although the Democratic Party has apparently not increased its overt strength, the New Majority the Nixonites spoke of in the 1972 election has now become but a memory. □

Book Review

Mr. Republican

A Biography of Robert A. Taft

by James T. Patterson
Houghton Mifflin $12.50

To my knowledge, Professor Patterson's biography of Robert A. Taft is the most comprehensive published to date. To be sure, Russell Kirk and James McClellan do a more thorough job of analyzing Taft's political thought in their *Political Principles of Robert A. Taft.* Patterson's work, however, is by any standard the most extensive we have of the life and times of Robert Taft.

Patterson has divided his work into seven major sections: "The Search for Self," "The Political Apprenticeship," "Rising in the Senate," "Sources and Uses of Power," "Mr. Republican," "Reaching for the White House," and "Responsibility." There are thirty-eight chapters under these major headings which in essence give us a chronology of Taft's ups and downs in the American political arena. Chapter one is entitled, "The Striving Boy," and chapter thirty-eight, "The Sudden Ending." Throughout Patterson's work we find commentaries concerning Taft's political strategies and political philosophy.

Many, particularly those born after World War II, will ask: Why would anyone write such a massive book (749 pages in all including index and extensive bibliography) about a senator who died nearly two decades ago and never did achieve, as we see from these pages, the pinnacle of political power in the United States? Why, to put the question otherwise, is Taft so important? Is it because, for a very brief period, he was majority leader in the Senate? Or could it be because he was respected and admired by his colleagues, stood against the welfare policies of Roosevelt II, adopted a militant anticommunist stance at a very early date in the Cold War, sought to redress the imbalance that existed between labor and business, or possibly, opposed Roosevelt II's interventionist policies prior to World War II?

Patterson's presentation might well lead us to believe that such is the case. And this is the flaw of an otherwise fine book. He does not tell us why Robert Taft was unique. One trained in political theory and familiar with the American political system must, perforce, go beyond the reasons offered in this volume for an appreciation of Robert Taft and what he meant for our Republic.

Why so? For the uninitiated there are at least three reasons.

First, Taft was a man of principle. As Patterson points out, for instance, Taft opposed the Nuremberg trials because such *ex post facto* proceedings violated every tenet of justice and civility known to the western world. This was an act of courage. As Patterson puts it: "Americans, it seemed, disagreed. The *New York Times* featured his speech on page one of its Sunday paper, and the services spread it across the country. Critics jumped at the chance to denounce him," and Senate Majority Leader Alben Barkley went so far as to declare that Taft "never experienced a crescendo of heart about the soup kitchens of 1932, but his heart bled anguishedly for the criminals at Nuremberg."

Beyond this, and perhaps more important, he opposed the usurpation of presidential authority. He opposed the deployment of American troops to NATO during peacetime (liberals harken!) without congressional approval. This unilateral decision he felt to be a violation of the Constitution, another unpopular stance which was duly criticized, even though it was defended by no less than Edward Corwin in the pages of the *New Republic.* In the same vein Taft opposed the New Deal and Roosevelt II. He fought, as Patterson makes clear, Roosevelt's rather devious tactics to involve us in the European War (again, liberals should harken).

Second, Taft was a practical but humane man. Much is made of the fact that certain of Taft's positions, principally those concerning federal aid to education and public housing, were inconsistent with his earlier opposition to the welfare policies of the New Deal. These matters seem to be of concern to Patterson, as well as to Kirk and McClellan. But the problem here, so far as I can perceive it, comes to this: To what extent can the national government effectively operate to secure changes in our society? Yes, indeed, it must be that Taft felt that *limited* measures on the part of the national government might be effectual in alleviating *certain* problems afflicting the nation. But one who is familiar or knowledgeable about his philosophy of government knows that he would never suggest, as do our modern day liberals, that the national government (not to mention the state governments) has a *carte blanche* to supervise every aspect of our lives with the end in mind of making us "better."

Moreover, as the Patterson volume makes clear, Taft did not believe we should indulge ourselves in the absurd Wilsonian notion that *we* could make the world safe for democracy. On this point, Taft's critics, Patterson among them, are quick to allege inconsistency: Why did he oppose deployment of American troops in Europe, vote against the NATO treaty, but later adopt a hard line anticommunist position with respect to our China policy and the conduct of the Korean War? Patterson writes: "Taft's message seemed clear; he was willing to oppose communism in faraway East Asia, but reluctant to do so in Europe....Taft himself had long ago joined the anti-Soviet chorus by accusing the Democrats of being 'soft' at Teheran and Yalta. How could he reconcile his denunciations of communist behavior with his opposition to NATO, an instrument intended to stop Soviet expansion? The answer was that he could not."

The truth is that there is an answer, somewhat involved but well known to students of that era: (a)The European Community, if one can call it such, never has from the inception of NATO shown any enthusiasm for it. The French and the English constantly squabbled. Their contributions have been minimal and even counterproductive. And, yes, it will be Senator Mansfield who wins the day—"let's get out." (b)The United States had demobilized after World War II, and we could not possibly hope at this juncture to defend Western Europe through the means of conventional warfare. Estimates vary as to the strength of the Soviet forces, but virtually all indicate that the Soviet army had the capability of conquering Western Europe—save for the fact that we possessed the atomic bomb. The A-bomb was our deterrent to Soviet aggression, not NATO, which to this day remains as nothing more than a paper barrier. And (c) the situation in "faraway East Asia" was essentially different because we found leaders who pleaded for our support against communist aggression. Our betrayal of Chiang

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Kai-shek through such insidious devices as the "Marshall Mission" will always remain as a blot on our honor.

And third, contrary to what Patterson intimates, Taft was never a serious contender for the Republican nomination until 1952. Unfortunately, he was not at this time the match for a World War II hero who didn't know what "parity" or "closed" or "open" shop meant. And herein we find the great divide in the Republican Party and, indeed, within the Democratic Party as well. How ironic it is that "Mr. Republican," a man dedicated and loyal to his party through the darkest of its years, could not win nomination over a contender who really did not know whether he was a Republican or a Democrat until it was convenient to do so.

Many, myself included, after the decision of the Convention wept unashamedly in the stench of the stockyards. On balance it seems that Taft was unwilling to make any deals with the likes of a Harold Stassen, Earl Warren, or Wayne Morse. This alone is credit to Taft. *He was a great man.* I console myself by reading Lord Bryce's comments about why great men are never elected to or selected for the presidency. Patterson, at the very least, tells us why this is so.

George Carey

Book Review

Fire in the Lake

The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam

by Frances FitzGerald
Little, Brown & Co. $12.50

For some time now it has been fashionable to explain American failures in Vietnam with clichés about understanding the Vietnamese "mind," "character," "culture," or what-have-you. While there is a great deal of truth in the clichés, all too often they are followed by simplistic interpretations which are of value only in confirming the veracity of the clichés.

Perhaps the most impressive undertaking along these lines is Frances FitzGerald's *Fire in the Lake* (the title of which is a metaphor for "revolution" from the *I Ching*). In spite of its having been selected as one of the five most important books of 1972 by the *New York Times*, it is not a bad piece of scholarship. Ms. FitzGerald prepared herself more thoroughly than most people who write about Vietnam: she benefited from the experiences of her late father, Desmond FitzGerald, a senior CIA official with considerable experience in Asia; she visited South Vietnam twice as a journalist (for a total period of about one year); she studied under the guidance of the respected French scholar, Paul Mus; and she familiarized herself admirably with the English- and French-language literature of the field. While the book is written with a distinct anti-Vietnam war bias, it lacks the elements of dishonesty found in many such volumes. FitzGerald reasons and writes well, and her book—while not essential reading—is quite good in parts and is recommended if read with caution.

Actually, *Fire in the Lake* is two books. The first half is, as the title implies, about Vietnam and the Vietnamese. It is here that FitzGerald attempts to explain the Vietnamese character, and to introduce the reader to the history, organization, and operation of the National Liberation Front (NLF). In part two, she introduces the Americans into her analysis and explains why they were destined to fail and why the communists are certain to win.

FitzGerald's explanation of the Vietnamese character is complete and convincing—certainly it is responsible for much of the attention which the book has received. Unfortunately, although it may well "make sense" to the lay reader, it is not a very accurate analysis of the subject. She has made a gallant effort to explain an extremely complex subject —Vietnamese culture—but she has not succeeded. The reader cannot but find irony in her assertion when discussing the National Liberation Front: "For a non-Vietnamese to write a full account of the NLF is finally an impossible undertaking" (p. 141). Would that she had been as cautious in undertaking to explain the immensely more intricate subject, Vietnamese culture. The topic is too complex to entertain seriously in a few paragraphs of a brief review, and this writer is hardly qualified for the task even under ideal circumstances. Perhaps it will suffice to note that even anti-Vietnam war scholars have labeled the FitzGerald analysis of Vietnamese national character as "little short of disastrous" (David Marr, *Journal of Asian Studies*, May, 1973, p. 564), and to invite readers who desire a more detailed critique of this portion of *Fire in the Lake* to peruse the first few pages of Ngo Vinh Long's "Fizzle in the Lake" (*Ramparts*, January, 1973, pp. 45+).

FitzGerald is perhaps at her best when discussing the organization and operation of the National Liberation Front, although this section, too, must be read with caution. Her discussion of "criticism" and "self-criticism" (thought reform)—*kiểm thảo*, which she consistently but incorrectly spells *Khiem thao* (one of numerous misspellings in her employment of Vietnamese terms)—is too brief but otherwise quite good. It is impossible to understand the communist movement in Vietnam without first understanding thought reform.

Although her account of Vietnamese history is more accurate than that found in most anti-war studies, she makes a number of rather distracting errors (clearly the consequence of flaws in her scholarship, not in her integrity). Two examples are her assertion (p. 223) that the North Vietnamese "land reform" was undertaken in 1956 (in fact it was undertaken in 1953 and concluded in 1956); and, on page 220, where she writes: "Upon bringing the name Vietnam into the name of his party, Ho Chi Minh took the concomital step of changing the phrase indicating socialism and his future social policy. For *cong san*, a phrase of Chinese roots suggesting a secular aggregate of individuals, he substituted *xa hoi*, a Vietnamese phrase linking the future distribution of wealth with the sacred communal traditions of the old village. (*Xa Hoi Dang* was the name of the socialist party within the Viet Minh.)" In the first place, the name "Vietnam" was in the name of Ho's party in 1930, before the Comintern ordered that the name be changed from "Vietnam Communist Party" to "Indochinese Communist Party." In the second place, the *Việt Nam Xã Hội Dảng* (Vietnam Socialist Party) created by the Viet Minh in July, 1946, was *not* Ho Chi Minh's party at all! It was a puppet organization created by the communists to rally more people to the Viet Minh Front, and it was clearly identified in its program as being the Vietnamese version of the Social-Democratic Parties of the Second International in Europe. The Socialist Party, like the puppet Democratic Party, remains active today in North Vietnam. It does little more than voice wholehearted approval of the policies established by Ho Chi Minh's real party, the Vietnam Worker's Party (*Dảng Lao Dông Việt Nam*)—the actual successor to the Indochinese Communist Party. In this instance, FitzGerald has simply misinterpreted her source (McAlister and Mus, *The Vietnamese and their Revolution*, Chapter 7).

FitzGerald obviously has considerable difficulty with the subject of Viet Cong terrorism. As an honest and capable scholar, she is forced to acknowledge: "If a landlord refused to cooperate, or if the NLF felt his death would serve a political purpose, he would be assassinated—and usually in public" (pp. 156-157); and "Often the Front would assassinate a GVN official as an 'example' to the villagers of what might happen if they decided to work for the government" (p. 187). She also notes such large-scale purges as the North Vietnamese "land reform" (which she calls [p. 223] "an anarchic campaign of terror" through which "by conservative extimate, some fifty thousand people of all economic stations were killed"), and the Hue massacre during the 1968 Tết offensive ([p. 174] "In the month that they occupied Hue the Front and the North Vietnamese forces murdered some three thousand civilians, including not only

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government officials, but hundreds of Catholics and members of other anti-Communist political parties and sects"). Having done this, she finds it necessary to fit these acts of terror into her orderly portrait of the NLF as being the "good guys" by asserting that the Front is careful in deciding who to murder: "[T]he Security cadre did not kill indiscriminately, but carefully calculated each of the assassinations for the maximum political effect. The lists of GVN officials to be assassinated or spies to be executed had to undergo long bureaucratic scrutiny before they could be put to use. The killings were then carried out in a cold-blooded manner by specially trained Armed Reconnaissance Teams" (p. 174).

She further asserts that the Hue massacre was the only "incident" in which the NLF perpetrated political violence on a massive scale (p. 174). Certainly Hue was the largest massacre in one place and at one time (it was, after all, the only city of any size that the communists had held for any length of time prior to the publication of *Fire in the Lake*), but what occurred in Hue was not an exception to party policy. Tens of thousands of similar "incidents" of political terrorism have taken place throughout South Vietnam over the years, and—although each act may seem inconsequential in comparison to Hue—when considered in the aggregate they dwarf the horror of the 1968 massacre. Having seen captured Viet Cong documents providing guidance to communist securety elements for the preparation of the "blood-debt" lists to which FitzGerald is referring, and having been told by very senior Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army defectors that several million South Vietnamese citizens are eligible for inclusion on these lists, I am personally not very impressed by arguments that the murders are "carefully calculated for maximum political effect," or that they are carried out cold-bloodedly by specially trained units (although FitzGerald is correct on both points). It is, in fact, this premeditated nature which makes them all the more detestable and augments the NLF's culpability *vis-à-vis* the American government and the horrible crimes of rage of a Lieutenant Calley.

Like most opponents of American involvement in Vietnam, FitzGerald is highly critical of the refusal by South Vietnamese President Diem to hold elections in 1956. Unlike most others, however, she acknowledges that the provisions for the proposed elections were contained not in the signed cease-fire agreement but in an unsigned declaration of the Geneva Conference (p. 67). Still, she charges: "Already in July [1955] Diem had repudiated the Geneva accords and, specifically, the article proposing a free election between the two regroupment zones" (p. 85). Similarly, she asserts (p. 438) that "the struggle of the NLF was an assertion of the principle of national unity that the Saigon government had endorsed and betrayed." What whe neglects to tell the readers is that: (1) It was Pham Van Dong, head of the communist Viet Minh delegation to the Geneva Conference, who first proposed that Vietnam be divided; and (2) The representative of the noncommunist State of Vietnam (South Vietnam) asked that there be no division of Vietnam but, instead, that the United Nations assume administrative functions throughout the entire territory and supervise the conduct of genuinely free elections. The United States also insisted that elections be under UN supervision "to insure that they are conducted fairly." It was only after the communists refused to agree to adequately supervised elections that the United States and South Vietnam objected. Far from repudiating the proposed elections in July, 1955, the Diem Government (represented at Geneva by Tran Van Do) made it clear from the start that it did not oppose the concept of unification elections, but it would not participate in any plebiscite with a more populous communist neighbor without adequate international supervision. It was the communist regime of North Vietnam, rather than the government of Ngo Dinh Diem, that asked for partition and ruled out genuinely free elections.

In reading *Fire in the Lake* one cannot help but recognize a double standard in FitzGerald's analysis. For example, she criticizes the United States for destroying the sources of Vietnamese identity (p. 429—"The land and the family were the two sources of national as well as personal identity. The Americans have destroyed these for many Vietnamese. . . by removing the people from the land and depositing them in the vast swamp-cities"); yet she refuses to take the communists to task for the same offense. This is not because she is unaware of the destruction of the traditional family by the NLF: "Unlike the ARVN [South Vietnamese army] soldiers, who usually settle their families near their fixed bases or in an accessible town, the Front fighters rarely saw their families more than once or twice a year . . . . The cadres did not attack the soldiers' filial ties directly; rather they played them down in a number of important ways. By performing the ceremonies of marriage and burial, by promising to support the crippled soldiers, to help the families of the dead and the wounded, and to pay special attention to those of the fighters' families who lived in the Liberated areas, they relieved the soldiers of their most pressing economic worries. For many of the fighters a sense of obligation was the strongest attachment they had to their families. The transfer of responsibility thus helped them to rationalize the breach of filial piety that they had made in the very act of joining the NLF. How can you help your families, the cadres asked, if the nation is in such trouble? The best thing you can do for your families is to fight for the Liberation." (p. 202-203). The destruction of the traditional family is apparently acceptable because "the NLF had offered them a new kind of family" (p. 226).

Another aspect of the double standard, although one which is perhaps more understandable, is FitzGerald's practice of comparing the often weak and corrupt practices of an existing government (the GVN) with the promises and temporary policies of a movement trying hard to win enough popular support to gain power. Thus she notes: "Land reform and a broad program of economic and social justice—these are the policies that gave it [the NLF] appeal to the rural people. If and when foreign governments cease to dominate the economy of the cities, the NLF program will seem equally attractive to many Vietnamese" (p. 438). Certainly this is true, because the NLF Program promises: freedom of speech, press, assembly and religion; an improvement in everyone's living conditions; the right to private property and free enterprise; "land to the tiller"; and—among other things—"to safeguard the interests" or "to show gratitude" to every conceivable interest group from office workers to soldiers.

However, when one notes (1) the control that North Vietnam exercises over the NLF, and (2) the fact that the NLF Program is virtually identical in substance with the various programs used by communist fronts prior to the take-over of North Vietnam, it behoves us to take a look at what happened once the communists actually got into power. In spite of all of the attractive promises which helped the Viet Minh win enough noncommunist support to gain power, the people of North Vietnam do not have the freedoms they were promised, the tillers do not own their own land (almost all of the land has been collectivized), and the traditional family is only a memory. As is the case in most totalitarian societies, children in North Vietnam are encouraged to spy on their parents and to report to their Party youth group leaders any violations of official policy.

The difference between the propaganda programs advocated by the Vietnamese communists, and the actual policies they implement once they gain power, is explained by Vietnam Worker's Party First Secretary Le Duan, who wrote in 1960: "Only by winning over the peasant masses . . . can the working class conquer the leadership of revolution. . . . That is why the Marxist-Leninist parties . . . must have suitable programs, policies, slogans, and styles of work to

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win over the peasantry" (Le Duan, *On Some Present International Problems*, Hanoi, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1964, p. 44). The evidence that the NLF intends to follow the totalitarian footsteps of North Vietnam, rather than the enticing promises of their propaganda Program, is overwhelming, and should make one skeptical of FitzGerald's rosy portrait.

By this point, few readers should be surprised to learn that FitzGerald is confident that the "good guys" (i.e., NLF) are going to win. The moment will arrive "for the narrow flame of revolution to cleanse the lake of Vietnamese society from the corruption and disorder of the American war" (p. 442). Perhaps she is right, but, if so, it will be more a consequence of superior organization and proselytization than of moral virtue or consonance with traditional Vietnamese society.

In spite of its flaws—only a few of which have been discussed above—*Fire in the Lake* is a worthwhile book. Frances FitzGerald is an intelligent and honest scholar, who has produced a highly readable and thought-provoking study of the Vietnam war. *Fire in the Lake* is certainly not the final word on the subject, but—if read with caution—it can provide a great deal of valuable information which can help us to understand Vietnam, the Vietnamese, and the Americans in Vietnam. For this, FitzGerald deserves our gratitude.

Robert F. Turner

Book Review

Out of the Ruins of Europe

by Walter Laqueur
Library $12.95

Out of the Ruins of Europe is a collection of previously published essays written over the course of twelve years. What is remarkable, therefore, is not that the book is "uneven" (as it is), but that it holds together as well as it does. The book does not constitute an autobiography, although the opening chapters about the author's youth in Wroclaw (which he still—self-consciously—calls Breslau) hold out the promise of considerable autobiographic material.

The unity of this collection of essays, diverse as they are in origin and subject matter, reflects the unity of Walter Laqueur's thought. The author is a living reminder of the arbitrariness of our convenient but conventional distinctions between historian and journalist, scholar and essayist, expert and popularizer.

That Laqueur stands astride or beyond such distinctions is apparent from the themes that recur throughout the essays, often in unexpected ways. Repeatedly Laqueur defends the writing of what he calls "contemporary history," that form of erudite political journalism which is exemplified in Europe by Pierre Hassner and Raymond Aron but which in America is at home neither in the universities nor in the media. A number of essays touch on the comparison of America to Weimar Germany; others consider the relationship between liberals and the extreme Left. The final section of the book is devoted explicitly to what Laqueur still calls, without embarrassment, The Jewish Question.

It is therefore understandable (but not forgivable) that Geoffrey Barraclough, the target of a critical but courteous review essay in this book, recently dismissed Laqueur's concern with Nazi responsibility for the war with the observation that "Laqueur, who was born in Wroclaw, can not see beyond the end of his European nose." Ironically, Laqueur's farsightedness is illustrated by the very article in which Barraclough made this unfortunate remark; for Barraclough bears out Laqueur's prediction that the epidemic of revisionist historiography on the Cold War was bound to spread to World War II. Mr. Barraclough now tells us that the Japanese, and apparently the Germans as well, were compelled by considerations of security to establish a military empire. This is, of course, a simple extension of the revisionist *apologia* for Stalin's notion of security in Eastern Europe after the war. Even if these farfetched claims were true, one would expect the "liberal" Barraclough to applaud the Allied policy of resistance to regimes whose security depended on military conquest of their neighbors. But that is Barraclough's problem, not Laqueur's.

Some of the essays in this collection were written as topical articles in response to the events of the previous decade; yet they still read surprisingly well. If any one of the articles is vulnerable to second-guessing with the aid of hindsight, it is "Bonn is not Weimar." This discussion of the possible reemergence of Nazism in West Germany was written in 1967, at a time when the right-wing NPD showed disturbing political strength. In retrospect it seems that Laqueur understood both the fascist character of the NPD and its potential importance in German politics. While it is true that the party's leadership often sounded more Gaullist than fascist, it is no less true that the NPD was a gathering point for unreconstructed Nazis and their youthful admirers. After a series of strong showings in state elections, the party marshalled all its forces in an attempt to clear the "five percent" hurdle and thereby gain national representation in the general election of 1969. The party garnered 4.7 percent of the vote. It emerged from the election with its energies spent and its fortunes declining. Had the NPD attracted several thousand more voters, it would have gained access to a national forum in the Bundestag. It might then have developed along the lines of Italy's MSI, now that country's fourth political party. It is doubtful that Willy Brandt could have conducted the *Ostpolitik*, or even that he could have become Chancellor under such conditions.

In any case, a comparison between the Federal Republic and Weimar would probably benefit as much from an analysis of the modern German Left as of the Right. For years the nominally liberal denizens of West German universities were fascinated by the exploits of the Baader-Meinhof gang, a band of Maoist terrorists whose leaders personified the alliance between intellectuals and common hoodlums so characteristic of radical politics in Weimar. (At about the same time, a similar alliance showed signs of developing in the United States.) The modern German Left is obsessed with "the Palestinian cause" to a degree that distinguishes it from radical movements in other western countries. As Laqueur has recently noted, Ulrike Meinhof paid tribute at her trial to the "progressive" character of Hitler's extermination of the Jews.

Much of Laqueur's writing is devoted to a description of the political foolishness of which intellectuals are capable. The author's own credentials place him above accusations of anti-intellectualism. Although he is an intellectual, he does not share in the view that his class is the natural guardian of private or public morality: "In [the intellectuals'] seclusion there is a constant temptation to devise political constructions firmly rooted in mid-air, in which everything seems possible, in which governments and political authority in general are replaced by communes of free and equal individuals, in which society exists without repression, and domestic policies require no sanctions, diplomats always tell the truth and nothing but the truth, and a foreign policy is pursued in which the wolf lies down with the lamb, and the leopard with the kid, all presumably under the strict supervision of Professor Noam Chomsky."

If political morality has held its own in the twentieth century, it has frequently been despite rather than because of the guidance of the universitied classes. The most spectacular article in this book is "Russia through Western Eyes," an overview of western reaction to Stalin's Russia in the 1930s. The enthusiasts of the Soviet new order included not only the hapless American Ambassador Davies but also western scholars, "experts" on Russia and the Soviet Union. Harold Laski, for example, was able to write in 1935, "Basically I did not see much difference between

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the general character of a trial in Russia and in [Britain]." Laski described Andrei Vyshinksy, the lackey who presided over Stalin's show trials, as "a man whose passion was law reform. . . . He was doing what an ideal Minister of Justice would do if we had such a person in Great Britain." With what *déja vu* must Laqueur view the current ecstasy over the "discovery" of China.

If academic sanction is not guarantee of moral purity, neither is it proof of theoretical insight. Laqueur was no friend to rioting students in the sixties; yet he offers a strikingly sympathetic explanation of at least one part of their problem: "There is nothing more discouraging than to behold the proliferation of social science non-subjects in which the body of solid knowledge proffered stands usually in inverse ratio to the scientific pretensions upheld. Whole sections of the universities could be closed down for a year or two, and the result, far from being the disaster to civilization which some appear to anticipate, would probably be beneficial."

If there is an unfortunate side to Laqueur's healthy skepticism about academic "non-subjects," it is that his animus against modern social science is such that he tends to identify bad theory with theory altogether. He emerges as a spokesman for the the study of history rather than political theory. The distinction is important, but Laqueur underestimates the extent to which the quality of his own work reflects his considerable ability to theorize about politics. His writings provide not only illuminating historical generalizations but explanations that draw on a broader understanding of politics. Laqueur is so insistent that his work has nothing in common with bad social science that he forgets how much it has in common with good social science.

Victor Baras

Book Review

Social Sciences as Sorcery

by Stanislav Andreski
St. Martin's $7.95

"Even a popular weekly like *Time* supplies a much better insight into American society than all the journals of sociology combined." Sociologist Stanislav Andreski doesn't mince his words when it comes to criticizing his fellows in the social sciences. They have reacted by ignoring this book, but he's not likely to care much: ". . . social and political studies have opened the gates of academic pastures to a large number of aspirants to the status of scientist who might have been perfectly useful citizens as post-office managers or hospital almoners, but who have been tempted into charlatanry by being faced with a subject utterly beyond their mental powers." The study of human beings, complex enough in subject matter, is made even more difficult because the objects of study react to what is said about them, making some statements self-fulfilling prophecies, and often making flattery profitable and criticism costly.

Andreski writes clearly, cleverly, and convincingly. Even the chapter headings reflect his iconoclastic humor: "Why Foul One's Nest?," "Manipulatlon Through Description," "Censorship Through Mass Production," "Evasion in the Guise of Objectivity," "Quantification as Camouflage," and my own favorite, "The Law of the Lighter Weights Rising to the Top." A professor of sociology at Reading University in England, he is writing, in part, to stir the consciences of his colleagues to sift the wheat from the chaff in the profession. Purging themselves will not be easy, he states, because those social scientists who have not deceived themselves about much of what fills their professional journals are under pressures not to be too critical of the vacuity of some of their colleagues' "contributions." "Fouling one's nest" is more taboo than incest and puncturing the pomposities of one's fellow practitioners is a no-no. Money (government grants, book royalties) go to those esteemed by their peers . . . a Zulu proverb is offered us, "a dog with a bone in his mouth cannot bark," and it is considered unseemly to jeopardize the playing of the game, though one's co-professionals allow one to play it in a variety of ways.

"Sorcery"? Science may be distinguished from witchcraft, Andreski suggests, by noting whether or not the stated goals are achieved by the means recommended. A country with plenty of capable engineers will tend to have more and better products of engineering than a country less blessed. Has the world's-record concentration of psychologists and psychiatrists and sociologists produced in twentieth-century America a happier, better-adjusted, more self-aware populace than that of other countries at other times? What 50 billion dollar per year American enterprise turns out the shoddiest product per dollar invested compared with similar enterprises abroad? Those readers who answer, "Education," move to the heads of their classes. ("Social Work" merits Honorable Mention.)

The study of human minds and societies deals with extraordinarily complex phenomena, further complicated by the rapidity with which certain aspects change and the response of the subjects to what is said about them. Self-fulfilling prophecies abound: tell someone he is likely to fail and he will likely fail; say there has arisen a new permissiveness, and the "bandwagon" effect will encourage the suggestible into promiscuity. Great harm has been done: ". . . the moral disorientation and fanatic nihilism which afflict modern youth have been stimulated by the popular brands of sociology and psychology with their bias for overlooking the more inspiring achievements and focusing on the dismal average or even the subnormal." As Duncan Williams argued in his excellent critique of modern literature and art, *Trousered Apes*, the emphasis on the base distracts and discourages those who might pursue the noble if their attention were so directed. Andreski cites this example of "manipulation by description": "By interpreting every manifestation of warm feelings between persons of the same sex as latent homosexuality, the psychoanalysts . . . have debased and well-nigh destroyed the concept of friendship, and have greatly contributed to the painful isolation of modern man."

Andreski gives examples of obfuscation or emptiness from a number of well-known men. Claude Levi-Strauss, Talcott Parsons, and R. D. Laing are among his targets. A major problem in sociology is the preoccupation with details of method at the cost of content, partly because it is safer to be mathematically elegant than to step on anybody's toes. The program of modern rationalism is to speak only with certainty and primarily about that which can be quantified; as Michael Oakshott stressed in his critiques of rationalism, this means saying very little with regard to values and ethics, crucial areas in the study of men. "Quantification as camouflage" is Andreski's label for a device popular among those who wish to be all things to all men. Corruption is hard to quantify, the participants being less than candid in their replies to questionaires, so it is not much studied, for example. The Soviet regime becomes a "goal-oriented mechanism" one of whose "inputs" was the lives of a million or so Kulaks. But there is no need to become alarmed—aren't all governments "goal-oriented mechanisms"? At least we've got the Kulak count right.

The difficulty of proving or disproving assertions in the social sciences is so great that it "gives a wide scope to ulterior motives, and provides immunity for the purveyors of false information." Let the "soc sci" students beware.

Someone wisely said that the problem with teaching sociology to collegians is that it seduces them into believing they understand a human phenomenon just because they have learned its name. Often reality is camouflaged by jargon, Andreski notes. "Socialization" is widely used as a euphemism for "shaping the individual to conform to the group's desires"; "ascribed" is used instead of "inherited" and obscures the meaning of such phrases as "ascribed wealth" and "ascribed intelligence." Shades of "alleged"! "Deviance" is so broadly used as to apply to the sadist and the saint, the nonconformist and the nincompoop.

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Why, Grandma, what big words you have! (The better to fool you with, my dear.)

Last year, computer simulations of population growth and resource depletion were the rage, typified by the work of Forrester and Meadows reported in *Limits to Growth*, which predicted catastrophic collapse of the world economy in a few decades. Professor Andreski is critical of such simulations, whether growth games or war games, because they focus on *outcomes* at the expense of analyzing the assumptions on which the model is built. Thus, much was written about how to avoid the coming "catastrophe." Recently, the Forrester-Meadows doom scenario has undergone withering attack on its assumptions; for instance, the market response by increasing prices for scarce goods was ignored. The mechanistic, cybernetic view of society as a goal-seeking machine ignores the competition within society over what goals are to be achieved. Goal-questioners become merely malfunctioning parts. The assumption that organizations pursue exclusively the goals for which they were first organized naively ignores the variety of motivations of organization members.

Mathematics may have replaced patriotism as a last refuge for scoundrels, at least in the social sciences. In a parody, Andreski offers "a mathematical model of jargon-mongering: (A/K) - 1 = V; the verbiage produced (V) equals the ratio of the author's ambition (A) to his knowledge (K) minus one." The ramifications of this relationship are left as an exercise for the reader. Andreski tells how, long ago, the great Swiss mathematician Euler silenced an argumentative Voltairian by writing on the blackboard in the debating hall: "$(x+y)^2 = x^2+2xy+y^2$, therefore God exists." His vain opponent gave in, not wishing to reveal his befuddlement by the mathematics, although we now understand that this does not prove the existence of God unless the process of exponentiation is commutative.

Andreski is more effective than most polemicists because he is hard to pigeonhole. He finds much of value in Marxism, but repudiates its dogmatism. Although critical of the hucksterism in the book business, he understands the market "often constitutes the chief (or even only) bulwark against an orthodoxy imposed by a bureaucratic machine. . . ." It is his opinion that money is corrupting the social sciences and that governments should give less rather than more support. The willingness to gore the oxen (or sacred cows) of liberals and conservatives alike is a persuasive token of his honesty.

Not that I would have you read Andreski's book uncritically. There is a part in which the astute professor seems to lose his usual clear-sightedness: in discussing the dearth of meaty books in the social sciences, he casts aspersions on the level of book reviewing in general. Not only does he suggest that friends are rewarded with good reviews and boat-rockers dismissed with unfavorable ones (or worse, silence), but he comes close to misleading our youth when he warns, "one must never assume without good evidence that the reviewer knows better than the author." I mean! The rest of the book is excellent.

Douglas W. Cooper

Book Review

Bare Ruined Choirs

by Garry Wills
Doubleday $7.95

"The Catholic Church," Lenny Bruce once observed, "was the only *the* Church." It was, Garry Wills points out, "the extreme taken as a type, the most fixed part of religion's stable landscape. If the forces of change can make it crumble, then what social institution can hope to stand?"

Mr. Wills takes the disarray of the Catholic Church as a model of institutional breakdown, tracing parallel agonies in church and state. He points out that disillusionment and a crisis of authority have followed on the shallow optimism of the Second Vatican Council, just as it did on the empty hopes of President John Kennedy's "Camelot" and Harvey Cox's "Secular City."

He believes that the Church has for much too long contributed to a "Catholic ghetto." By the "Catholic ghetto," Wills is not referring to a ghetto of a racial or economic kind; rather, he is talking about a ghetto mentality, "an isolation from the intellectual currents of this country." Catholics, Wills contends, were forced to accept on faith answers that failed to satisfy them intellectually; they were required to conform blindly to Church teachings, for there was never any room for doubt. "If faith was a virtue," observes Wills, "and doubt was opposed to it, then doubt was a sin. But sin is in the will—so intellectual objection to the faith must be *willed* away by virtue, by one's faith. . . . Letting the intellect dwell on any doubt was like entertaining impure thoughts. . . . So at times one had to ignore one's faith in order to retain it. . . . "

This ghetto mentality was largely responsible for the attitude of many Catholics regarding the change that came about because of Pope John and the Second Vatican Council. D. H. Lawrence once remarked that our civilization's "dirty little secret" was sex. But apparently the Church, too, had its own "dirty little secret": change. Wills tells us that "the church's secret, hidden away in official teaching, minimized when it could not be ignored, was *change*. Other things came and went, captive to history. But the gates of hell would not prevail against the church . . . . We have yet to learn all the good wrought by 'Vatican Two', and all the damage. But the main point about the Council can be put quite simply: *it let out the dirty little secret*. It forced upon Catholics, in the most startling symbolic way, the fact that *the church changes*."

Great American Series

The Nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest.

—George Washington

Some of the changes ushered in by Vatican II were transformations in liturgy—the introduction of the vernacular into the mass and the simplification and shortening of the mass—the introduction of a "questioning spirit" and a "spirit of democracy" into the Church, more autonomy on all levels of the Church, and more power and responsibility for lay persons. To many Catholic intellectuals, these changes were not only in the right direction but also long overdue; to the mass of Catholics, however, this experience of change engendered not rejoicing, only shock and disillusionment. As Wills points out, for the mass of Catholics Vatican II and its aftermath "threatened psychic ruin for them personally, as well as institutional jeopardy for the church."

For those Catholic intellectuals who supported Pope John and Vatican II, John Kennedy represented the kind of Catholic liberalism that would revamp the political and social orders according to their blueprints. It is true, of course, that they had not at first been ardent for Kennedy's election, for as Wills explains, "the Catholic liberal wanted liberalism in politics, not Catholicism—that was the very point he strove to make. Politics was, for him, a world separate and quite different from religion; so the truer liberal—i.e., Adlai Stevenson—had, at the outset, a stronger claim on him than a fellow Catholic with Jack Kennedy's dubiously liberal past."

Yet, as Wills claims, despite their initial doubts, Catholic liberals came to see that Kennedy better served their purposes, for "his defense of the secular realm's autonomy had more impact *because* he was a Catholic. And if one were to have a Catholic president, it was better to have Kennedy than Gene Mc-

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Carthy. The former was not only free *in* his Catholicism, but free *of* it."

In the Catholic liberal's scheme of things, Kennedy's detachment from religion was his main virtue and advantage, since "Kennedy represented the first tenet of a Catholic liberal by being so exclusively secular in his political judgments." Indeed, so secular was Kennedy in his judgments regarding political affairs that when Protestant theologian Harvey Cox sang the praises of *The Secular City*, he claimed that Kennedy epitomized all the virtues of that City.

The real purpose of Cox's book is revealed in the last chapter, which addresses itself to Dietrich Bornhoffer's question, "How do we speak in a secular fashion of God?" We must no longer, Cox answered, speak of Him in terms of mythology or metaphysics, for they are dead too. According to Cox, only politics had stayed alive. "In secular society," wrote Cox, "politics does what metaphysics once did. It brings unity and meaning to human life and thought." Politics, as Wills observes, became "the only way left to talk of reality." Politics, that is to say, soon became absolutized, for in Harvey Cox's "Secular City" God was dead and thus politics was forced to perform what only religion can and must do.

Ironically, "All those who had been glad at the death of God were sad at the death of Kennedy. God's death had been the death of mystery. . . . But Kennedy's death signaled the rebirth of mystery—the mystery of evil." Soon even Harvey Cox would be writing: "I used to believe, and even hope, that mankind might someday outgrow the religious phase and live maturely in the calm, cool light of reason. But people have been predicting the death of God for centuries. And I no longer seriously believe it will happen, nor do I hope it will."

But, alas, although Kennedy's tragic death signaled the rebirth of mystery, it did not end the confusion regarding the secular and spiritual realms, for increasing numbers soon began viewing politics as not only the proper instrument for achieving "The Great Society," but also as the means of our deliverance. What developed from this confusion concerning God and Caesar was, in the words of Wills, "a very one-sided arrangement, based on mutual aggrandizement—the state will leave the church alone, so long as church never criticizes state." After all, Wills sardonically observes, "such criticism would be 'politics,' in which churches should not meddle. But agreeing with the state—to congratulate and celebrate it—is not 'politics.'" Thus religion is trapped, frozen, in its "perpetual de facto accommodation of power." It becomes "a social ornament and buttress, not changing men's lives, only blessing them; not telling men to do this or omit that, just congratulating them for whatever they do or do not do." Religion is invited to "praise our country, our rules, our past and present, our goals and pretensions, under the polite fiction of praying for them all." Religion, then, becomes ***nothing but*** a vehicle for the maintenance of order in society. And, alas, when this occurs, observes Wills, "the divine is subordinated to the human—God serves Caesar. This is what Americans quaintly call 'freedom of religion,' and what the Bible calls idolatry."

Haven Bradford Gow

Whadja Expect?

Time was when I liked being from Connecticut. Visiting other states, one heard such pleasant recognitions: "Oh, yeah, that's where nuclear submarines come from" or Colt firearms or ball bearings. No more. Now and for the foreseeable (and just when we'd finally lived down those phony nutmegs), the name of Connecticut is hopelessly coupled with that of—Weicker. (Expectorate it, please, like Micawber in the comeuppance scene reiterating "*Heep!*")

His Lachrymosity, please believe me, is not universally beloved out here. Some of us with long memories recall how he made his way into the U.S. Senate: He ran as a Republican; the endorsed Democrat was a free-lance clergyman and ADA paper-shuffler named Joseph Duffy, but a great many unreconstructed Democrats preferred an independent candidate, the moribund Thomas Dodd. It was a delightful campaign. While Weicker went about portraying him as a one-man Weatherman bomb-and-orgy squad, poor Duffy devoted his scanty energies to refereeing staff disputes over whether or not to bill himself as *The Reverend*; Dodd, meanwhile, bumbled along with chin up and smile bright and every hair in place, looking more like an embalmer's *chef d'oeuvre* every day. And so Weicker went to Washington, giving the last laugh to Dodd, who must be laughing still as he beholds the pompous clowns who censured him yawning and squirming through his successor's weepy tirades.

There he sits, pouting and prating of Morality, Decency, Fair Play, and the American Way. If he is not silenced, I fear, the television audience will rise up as one and go on a rampage of wife-beating, poor-box-robbing, lynching, sodomy, and ticket-fixing unprecedented in the annals of the Republic.

Now, whom does Senator Weicker think he's kidding? He knows perfectly well that Morality, Decency & Co. are mere suitable-for-framing rumpus room curios, no longer traded on the American exchange. For this he blames Richard Nixon, even more stridently than Mr. Nixon blames the drugged *jugend* who lately shambled through the pages of the Luce publications. All in all, I cannot help believing Mr. Nixon has the better case. Consider—he is an impressionable boy from the hinterlands. He nails Alger Hiss, and while his own putative friends breathe their relief and turn to other matters, Hiss' chums launch what amounts to an industry. Several crises later, Mr. Daniel Ellsberg turns to crime and finds it not only profitable, but the key to all the best salons. He even hits the sawdust trail, joining a burgeoning crew of thieves, rapists, murderers, Indians, sworn overthrowers of the Constitution, and imported navel-contemplators, each and all of whom coin money by assuring the rubes that Nixon is a monster. Over on the cultural front, Nixon beholds children swooning over the likes of Mr. David Bowie, the English androgyne, and Mr. Alice Cooper, who simulates fornication with a snake on stage (a spectacle hitherto reserved for sailors passing through the Panama Canal). Tuning in the Top Forty, he hears *his* kind of music: The Andrews Sisters singing "Boogie-Woogie Bugle Boy," only to be told it's not Patty, Maxine, and Laverne but Ms. Bette Midler, just now the rage of Manhattan's gay bathhouses (she goes right in and sings, you see, and the boys crowd around, chastely wrapped in their towels, you should have *been* there the night Mick Jagger stopped by).

Surveying rot and corruption on every side, poor Mr. Nixon must have concluded, in his rather simpleminded way, that he might as well have a little fun along with everybody else. Since it is power, not money or orgasms, that amuses him, he did, or permitted to be done, or was too busy to notice, all those things that so outrage Senator Weicker, whose indignation is marvelously limited, missing as it does every permutation of lewdness, debauchery, fraud, perversion, and simony in its singleminded

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concentration on, of all things, corruption in government. Fretting about corruption in government, in times like ours, is like worrying about the possible spread of mononucleosis at a sex orgy. But, moan the Weickerites, government must set a good example. Bosh. A free and happy people needs occasional reassurance that the government is less honest, truthful, and virtuous than it is. When government goes heavily into the goodness business, as under Roosevelt II or John Kennedy, and the newsmerchants cooperate in the hoodwinking of the public, tyranny looms. Let a virtuous government sneak into power, and it straightaway grabs the citizen by the ears and tries to lift him up into the realms of light, *cf.* Robespierre (like Weicker a wearer of tinted spectacles).

I for one welcome the relatively minor and innocuous misdeeds of the Nixon Administration as healthy signs, portending as they do a decline in the moral tone of government, and a consequent expansion of the citizen's freedom, undreamed of since the days of Ulysses S. Grant. □

Book Review

What Went Wrong With American Education

by Peter Witonski
Arlington House $6.95

Ten years ago, on an uncommonly hot September afternoon, having spent thirty minutes perspiring in queue to register for an idiotic freshman geology course at George Washington University, I reached a decision. I concluded that while a few things in life are worth standing in line for, American higher education is not one of them. Although that hastily-reached decision involved abandoning a generous scholarship, offending a number of well-intentioned educational bureaucrats, and inflicting a measure of short-term anguish on my immediate family, it turned out to be the right one. And, judging from my recent contacts with the academic world, and the devastating picture painted by Peter Witonski, what might have been a rather eccentric move on my part ten years ago would clearly be the rational thing to do today.

While a utilitarian function continues to be served by result-oriented departments such as engineering, chemistry, and medicine, the old goal of a true liberal education—the original aim of the university as an institution—has been drowned by successive waves of instrumentalists, social reformers, and substandard students and faculty, always in the name of some higher cause.

Perhaps the greatest irony of all these reform movements is that, besides destroying the traditional values of a university education, they have consistently failed to achieve their own avowed goals. In 1943, for example, that benevolent old fluff, James Bryant Conant, then President of Harvard, righteously proclaimed that "the primary concern of American education today is not the development of the appreciation of the 'good life' in young gentlemen born to the purple. . . . Our purpose is to cultivate in the largest possible number of future citizens an appreciation of both the responsibilities and the benefits which come to them because they are Americans and are free."

Unfortunately (but not unpredictably) the shift from traditional standards of educational excellence to mass social conditioning has resulted in more student alienation from American society, not less. Its only accomplishment has been to place more meaningless, devalued diplomas into the hands of more mediocre people than ever before. The parents who pay for this questionable operation seem to accept it as a moral duty, unquestioning. Intimidated by their ever more grubby offspring, and in hopeless awe of the higher education label, they continue to dump their postpubescent charges into academia's lap in the vague hope that, after four years there, little Ernest and Ernestine will be ready to face life or matrimony without further parental bankrolling.

Yet they are often disturbed by the obvious results—more and more youthful meatheads leaving the university in even worse shape than they entered it. Like so many mounds of overlarded hamburger, they graduate, after four years of aimless oozing, having



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thoughtlessly absorbed large doses of the mental meat tenderizer of American academia—cliché leftism. What seems to have been forgotten by Dr. Conant and the worse things that have come after him is the fact that civilized institutions—be they artistic, economic, academic, or governmental—require a certain number of civilized maintenance men. These maintenance men used to be supplied by selective, traditionally structured universities that emphasized a rich appreciation and understanding of western civilization.

Those days are gone, however, and now the machines are beginning to break down. Peter Witonski has done some serious thinking on the deeper causes of the breakdown and reached some interesting conclusions. His latest book is a useful guide to anyone seriously concerned about the state of American education at all levels and how it might be salvaged. Since Witonski is also a literate fellow with an ample measure of wit, it also reads well, despite a few traces of hastiness in preparation.

Besides providing much helpful information on current student opinion, the role of the federal government in determining educational policy, and the impact of New Left violence, Witonski also states an interesting case concerning underlying causes. While aggravated by Dewey and his more rabid successors, he says, the root problem of American education goes all the way back to the beginnings of the Republic and the ingrained Yankee notion that mass "practical" education is the desirable goal of our educational system. This was the logical precursor of the current devaluation in academic standards and climate in which, "while grades are rising at colleges and universities across the land, scholastic aptitude scores are falling."

One almost bemoans the passing of that extinct class, the slightly neurotic, rather despotic but wholely dedicated spinster teacher and/or austere teaching nun who at least succeeded in pounding the basic elements of mathematics and reading into their balky charges, along with a modicum of civility, clarity of thought and expression, and hygeine. Left to their own devices today, the same class of adolescents have somehow managed to spawn twin epidemics of illiteracy and venereal disease in the most overschooled, overmedicated society in the world.

What does Witonski suggest by way of improvement? Raise standards; eliminate second-rate universities, faculties, and students; set up a dual secondary school system that separates wheat from chaff, along European lines; and see to it that noncollege material is channeled into practical trade and technical training centers.

Until we follow such a course, too many unqualified college instructors will be teaching (or, rather, attempting to teach) too many unqualified college students with abysmal results to themselves and the institutions they supposedly serve.

Good luck, Peter, but don't hold your breath.

Aram Bakshian, Jr.

Make 'em Laugh; Make 'em Cry

You go to the movies in a funk, some film matches your temperament that day; you emerge proclaiming it a "majestic cinema treatment of a universal theme." Or the sun's tickling every fiber, the one you love loves you truly, truly dear, and shows it; all's well, and some sing-a-ding-a-ling flick seems like the happiness masterwork of the decade. The temper we carry into the theatre, as much as the film itself, conditions the opinions we take from the experience to—in my case—the typewriter.

Sometimes, not infrequently, one finds two sets of conflicting reactions, thought patterns, approaches, operating during a film viewing. On a light level, for instance: in the spring I went off to *Brother Sun, Sister Moon*: perfectly charming to look at, lovely kids, Nature natural, greener than green, and on in that vein; but the inane screenplay, the acting, the asinine cavorting about and silly resonances of current events to give, ugh, "relevance" to Saint Francis. All right, I say to myself: now hold on, separate your aesthete's eye from your critical glare, get it in perspective, let that witless cartoon-strip of a live-action movie have it. Which I did.

But it isn't always that simple. The conflicting approaches, bi-level emotions, reasoned film reviewer's backlog of experience fighting with the eternal little boy movie-lover's wonderment that the thing up there can move and can move me—all this conjoins not to produce, as one would hope, a well-made critique the next day, but to leave me with two sets of notes, as though two different heads saw the same film, the same night, the same two hours of, say, *Scarecrow*. This film calls, perhaps, for the thoroughly ruthless critic (John Simon, maybe) to eviscerate its cheapjack emotionalism, to expose its manipulativeness, and to give no quarter even to the merits of the film, which are several, if overwhelmed by the faults. Mr. Simon, I should guess, would be savage. I would too, were *Scarecrow*'s only memory for me an awareness of its tricks played *on* me.

Scarecrow tells of two losers. Max, played by the estimable Gene Hackman, is just out of jail for fighting, a pattern he's developed of busting up people and places 'til he gets busted again and again himself. Max is heading East, first to Denver to see his sister, then to Pittsburgh to set up a car wash with a small reserve of money. At the picture's start, he crosses paths in some isolated area with one Lionel (whom Max rechristens "Lion"), acted by Al Pacino, like Hackman an actor of diverse talents, some most likely still untapped. They're an unlikely pair, the boffo-socko and the tender innocent. Max at first tries to avoid hooking in with Lion, but at last their inability to hitch a ride brings them together, Max sweeping

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Lion up in his plan to conquer the world with car washes.

Before the trek to Detroit, where Lion wants to see his child, born after he had abandoned his girl to run off to sea for five years, they follow train tracks to Denver, there to contact sister Coley (Dorothy Tristan) and her partner, a sex-starved woman (Ann Wedgeworth) who gives Max what he needs. Despite the obvious advantages of settling in Denver—both men are happy, both women are happy, why not Denver?—it's not to be. A fierce fight one evening in a roadhouse lands the men in jail; Max, who's guilty of initiating the fight with a bunch of toughs, blames the innocent Lion for it and refuses to speak to him for their month on a prison farm. Lion, naive beyond words, allows himself to be aided by a prison sharpie (Richard Lynch), whose aim is eventually revealed: sex. Lion refuses, horrified, and is beaten by his friend-turned-tormenter; Max then beats the bully and we're off again.

Scene four takes them to Detroit. Lion calls his ex-wife (or ex-girlfriend), who berates him for deserting her, then lies to him, telling him that their child was stillborn. Lion tells Max only that the kid is fine, is a boy, and that he thinks he won't mess up the lives of those he's deserted by visiting them. He acts carefree, goes off to play with some kids at a park fountain, and freaks out. At the end, Lion has either died or remained catatonic; Max leaves, alone, for Pittsburgh. Close.

Just about every tear-jerking gambit but piteous oldsters in retirement homes is paraded out to evoke sympathy. The two guys are obviously such nice, pathetic fellows; the girls are such toughies with hearts of gold; the despair eating Lion, who believes himself not only a deserter, which he is, but also the precipitating cause of his child's death, is so touching. The piled up woes are so arranged as to show us the weight of hopelessness impinging on guys born losers. Lion's personal aphorism—"people can't stay mad at you if you make them laugh"—and his pet theory (whence derives the film's name) that scarecrows don't scare crows but instead amuse them, thereby securing the crow's beneficence on the farmer who sets up the scarecrow, mark him as the beloved simpleton, the sweet boy-man whose final collapse into anguish tears us, the audience, apart. As if programmed on a machine, the set-up's perfect: we don't like these chaps at first; they are crude; we come to favor them as they come to favor each other; we feel for their feelings; we cry with their sadness.

Were it only that, we would mark it off as a fabulously successful entry in the hearts-and-flowers, bottom of the barrel sweepstakes. But it is more. It is also cinematography by Vilmos Zsigmond (who did the splendid work in *Deliverance* and *McCabe and Mrs. Miller*). It is also visions of contemporary America ringing true, the grit and grime of a culture increasingly lacking style, grace, warmth, but possessed everywhere of that particular ease, that forwardness, that optimism we call "Amer-

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ican." It is mythic: the lonesome buddies myth, the On the Open Road myth, the myth of the Yankee struggle for success out of adversity. OK, they don't make it, but they work at making it. They put their wounded selves into the struggle and fail the test: one fades out, the other goes courageously on, on, we guess, to more failure, however dogged his zeal.

Scarecrow straddles that line between sentiment and sentimentality; it lapses into mawkishness, then rises fitfully to genuine humor laced with spunk. *It* cannot be both awful and splendid, though parts are one or the other. I reach back now to recollect my mood when I saw it, to try to see what *I* put into *Scarecrow*, to determine (and I fail at the effort just now) why I am now dangling between giving a slap or a buss to this extraordinarily moving, yet unconscionably artificial film. □

Book Review

An Introduction to Christian Economics

by Gary North
Craig $9.95

What we have here is a collection of Mr. North's essays on economics, only a few of which are explicitly Christian, and none at a level one would call "introductory." Mistitled or not, the essays are very good indeed.

Economics, as a science, is "value-free." It is not supposed to make moral judgments about what is right, fair, or just. Christianity, of course, does deal with moral values. So how can there be such a thing as "Christian economics"? How can you fuse Christian belief with a value-free science?

To a Christian, that question is inverted. How can there be a valid economics except in a God-ordered world? As North explains it, economics works because it is based on the right "givens," on premises borrowed from Christianity. For instance, the all-important economic fact of scarcity is an exact counterpart of God's curse upon the earth (Gen. 3:17-19). Whether scarcity is expressed in biblical or scientific terms, the Christian economist knows that it imposes a limit on human action that men cannot overcome. Neither men alone nor their governments can turn stones into bread.

North brings the best of both sides to these essays, although the book is heavily weighted towards, and most useful for, the economics. North has studied the great works of von Mises, Rothbard, Hayek, Rushdoony, Roepke, and Hazlitt. From these wellsprings he has drunk deeply of erudition and, like most young writers, he tends to use rather more of it than is called for. But this degree of scholarship, while limiting his readership, is the more rewarding to those who have the background and intelligence to stay with him in his skilled discussions.

I do not mean to imply that North's prose resembles that gray-green sludge that Distinguished Professors of Economics pass off as writing. Not at all. North writes well, with occasional wit. He also has the knack of picking just the right quote to tack down a point. In a couple of the essays, he quotes Isaiah on the moral and financial ravages of inflation: "How is the faithful city become an harlot! it was full of judgment; righteousness lodged in it; but now murderers. Thy silver is become dross, thy wine mixed with water: Thy princes are rebellious, and companions of thieves" (Isaiah 1:21-23).

That debasement of the currency is accompanied by moral decline has been observed in every inflation, not least by Peletiah Webster at the time of the racking "Continental" inflation that prolonged and nearly ruined the American Revolution: "We have suffered more from this cause [paper money inflation] than from any other cause or calamity. It has killed more men, pervaded and corrupted the choicest interests of our country more, and done more injustice than even the arms and artifices of our enemies."

North is at his best on the subject of inflation. He starts with the pure definition, "any increase in the money supply," and summons up flawless arguments against it. Inflation is an invisible, unpredictable tax on capital. It usurps and centralizes power in the state. It distorts the market's pricing mechanisms and thus makes efficient allocation of resources impossible (one by-product: pollution). It redistributes capital from efficient (by preinflation standards) producers to less efficient producers. It acts unevenly, enriching those individuals or businesses nearest to, and favored by, the state at the expense of those furthest and least favored. It encourages unscrupulous debtors to discharge their debts with depreciated paper worth a fraction of the sum owed. It encourages manufacturers to hide price increases in the form of poor and shoddy merchandise. The Christian would add: inflation is *theft*. It is wrong. You cannot achieve good ends with thieving. Institutional theft leads to social disaster.

You cannot turn stones into bread. You cannot create wealth by printing paper bills and designating them money. It ought to be obvious. Yet both the Keynesians and the Chicago school of economists share the notion that inflation *stimulates* the production of new wealth. Indeed, a gush of new paper money does appear to stimulate productivity at first. But the new paper is in fact stealing existing wealth, for those who do the inflating and those nearest

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

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them. The economic stimulus flows to the less efficient, state-favored, otherwise noncompetitive industries, at the same time efficient producers are being driven out of business. In a word, counterfeit money produces counterfeit industry.

Four or five of the essays are devoted to the subject of inflation, including one with the catchy title, "Gertrude Coogan and the Myth of Social Credit." All these fall under Part I, "Monetary Theory." The book has three other sections: "Economic Survival," "Christian Stewardship and Resource Allocation," and "Antinomianism." Don't worry if these section headings have a somewhat forbidding ring to them, as do such essay titles as "Urban Renewal and the Doctrine of Sunk Costs"; "Social Antinomianism"; "The Crisis of Soviet Economic Planning." They're not as bad as they sound. Not even the one about Gertrude Coogan, which takes on the Crank (anti-international banking conspiracy) Right. Others of the essays seem a bit sassier and more inviting: "The Ethics of Monetary Hoarding"; "The Economics of Women's Liberation" (which slams the notion of "equal pay for equal work"); and "The Theology of the Exponential Curve."

Warmly recommended to students of *laissez-faire*.

Timothy Wheeler

Book Review

The Semblance of Peace

The Political Settlement after the Second World War

by John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls
St. Martin's $35.00

Even the bitterest of enemies can be united by a common danger.
—Aristotle

The unmasking of the subterfuges perpetuated by the Cold War revisionists is continually gaining momentum. John Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nichols, two distinguished English historians, have made a major contribution to this task. Debunking, however, is not the purpose for which the book was written, as the revisionists and their writings are seldom acknowledged. The volume is essentially a recounting and analysis of the complex diplomatic relations among the Allies during World War II. The emphasis is placed on those negotiations and events that relate to the postwar settlements—the semblance of peace that became the Cold War. The authors also include chapters detailing the peace conferences and treaties signed with various Axis powers, and several appendices dealing with such matters as the present status of the Munich Agreement.

The Soviet Union had been at odds with the capitalist nations since 1918. The Grand Alliance was an uneasy gathering from the start. The difficulties involved in the maintenance of alliance cohesion were rooted in the conflicting long-range political objectives entertained by the Big Three.

Roosevelt and the United States, through the establishment of a new type of international system, hoped to replace the "outmoded" balance of power systems and spheres of influence. The new system was to be a concert of Great Power global gendarmes acting under the auspices of a world organization.

Churchill and Great Britain foresaw postwar Europe in terms of the "power political" concepts so disdained by the Americans. The prescient Churchill realized that a shattered Europe would produce a vacuum extending from Russia to the Channel coast. The Soviet Union could potentially dominate all of continental Europe. Great Britain—standing alone and completely drained by the war—would not have the resources to balance Soviet power. The assistance of the United States and a revived France was required. The British perceived a world organization as a vehicle for preventing the United States from returning to her traditional isolationist posture.

Stalin and the Soviet Union sought to "...regain for the Soviet Union the territorial strength and political influence which Tsarist Russia had exercised in the past and if possible to exceed it." Stalin at a minimum wished to recover the territories that had been ceded in the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Riga: Finland, parts of Poland, Bessarabia, and Kars and Ardahan (controlled by Turkey).

Roosevelt was a Wilsonian romantic who, in the conduct of foreign affairs, evinced a startling naiveté. He placed an inordinate amount of faith in the ability of charm and goodwill to conquer different *Weltanschauungs* and national interests. Examples abound. Roosevelt sought to convene a peace conference in early 1940 during the *Sitzkrieg*. He entertained the notion, as related by Rexford Tugwell, that at such a conclave, "...the famous Roosevelt charm...would have its chances..." to bring peace. FDR wrote Churchill in March, 1942: "I hope you will not mind my being brutally frank when I tell you I can personally handle Stalin better than either your Foreign Office or my State Department." Cordell Hull paraphrased the following incredible conversation: "Roosevelt spoke of making an appeal to Stalin on grounds of 'high morality' so that plebiscites should be held in the Baltic states and eastern Poland." (It is worth noting Stalin's private reaction to Roosevelt's "charm" and appeals to "higher morality" as told by Milovan Djilas: "Churchill," said the Marshall, "is the kind who if you don't watch him, will slip a kopeck out of your pocket... And Roosevelt? Roosevelt is not like that. He dips his hand only for bigger coins.")



Initially the Americans distrusted the British as much, and frequently even more, than they did the Russians. Roosevelt and his advisors saw Churchill as an imperialist and practitioner of "power politics" in the grand tradition. They suspected the Prime Minister of seeking to involve the United States in a conflict with the Soviet Union in the pursuit of that odious concept—the balance of power. In addition, Washington surmised that London was attempting to dupe the United States into helping maintain the British Empire.

Churchill and Eden continually worked to coordinate diplomatic policy with Washington. They were particularly concerned with formulating common negotiating positions prior to the three great wartime conferences—Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam. The American decision makers, however, refused to cooperate out of consideration for Stalin's sensibilities about the West "ganging up" on the Soviet Union. The authors argue that the failure of Washington and London to present a united front encouraged Stalin's aggressiveness.

Churchill consistantly advocated resurrecting France as a Great Power, and he also proposed the creation of a Balkan federation. The Prime Minister of course hoped to produce the means of balancing Soviet power on the continent. The United States (and naturally the Soviets) steadfastly opposed Churchill's designs. A Balkan federation smacked too much of spheres of influence for American taste. As for France, Roosevelt harbored an abiding prejudice against the French due to their shoddy performance in the war and a personal dislike for de Gaulle. He even went so far as to tell Stalin that, "...the first

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

I was glad to receive the October issue. I had wondered where you were. But I am tired of all this talk about queers. Let's give it up.

Ronald Sandford
Indianapolis, Indiana

To the Editor:

. . . No more queer talk. Get off the nonsense. . . . If this continues, I shall return to reading *Psychology Today*.

Paul Whiting
Chicago, Illinois

To the Editor:

It was good to hear from you again. If you continue to run reviews like Shulsky's, Valis', Howe's, Lynch's, and Luce's, I will renew my subscription.

Incidentally, I feel your treatment of Watergate was a bit dishonest. After all, you people supported Nixon. What else did you expect from him?

Steve Babich
Los Angeles, California

To the Editor:

It seems Tom Huston is unclear about Nixon. It also seems that he is unclear about the role of government in a modern society. Today, government influences the lives of the poor in so many pernicious ways, it is only just that government do something to alleviate the conditions of those who live in poverty. I suggest Mr. Huston think about how anxiety and frustration gnaw at a poor man's life and make the pursuit of useful employment much more difficult than it is for a man living more comfortably.

L.W. Smith
St. Louis, Missouri

---

necessity for the French, not only for the Government but the people as well, was to become honest citizens." (The reviewer would note that the memory of Roosevelt's attitude may have been partially responsible for de Gaulle's troublesome policies in the early 1960s.)

Soviet intentions were manifested in the famous 1939 Non-Aggression Pact with Nazi Germany. Stalin's share of the spoils included many of the territories enumerated above. The Marshall reaffirmed Soviet ambition in a significant meeting with Eden in December, 1941: "Russia...was to retain all the fruits of her partnership with Nazi Germany..." The Russian leader even went so far as to link military alliance with a British acceptance of his territorial demand. (Eden, however, refused to be bullied.)

Wheeler-Bennett and Nichols are somewhat ambiguous as to why the Soviets were eventually able to subjugate Eastern Europe. On the one hand, they astutely observe that this development was inevitable after Tehran. For it was at Tehran that the decision was finally made to launch a cross Channel assault against Hitler's Western Wall rather than drive from the Mediterranean into the Balkans and central Europe. On the other hand, the authors assert that Roosevelt's pacifistic attitude encouraged Stalin to be more acquisitive than he would otherwise have been.

Following Yalta, as the great victory approached, fissures in the Alliance structure were catalyzed, grew, and became ever more apparent. The American decision makers became increasingly alarmed over the evolving Soviet subjugation of Eastern Europe and the range of Soviet ambition: "The idealism about the postwar international relations...was beginning to crumble in the face of that outmoded concept, the sphere of influence." *Semblance of Peace* makes a convincing case for the view that even Roosevelt's attitude was undergoing a dramatic change in the weeks immediately preceding his death. FDR stated at a White House luncheon on March 24, 1945: "...we can't do business with Stalin. He has broken every one of the promises he made at Yalta." Near the end of his life, Roosevelt and Stalin exchanged a series of acrimonious notes dealing not only with Eastern Europe but also the so-called Berne Incident and the outrageous Soviet treatment of liberated American prisoners of war.

The reviewer has several criticisms to make of what is generally a brilliant work. The authors have overlooked two statements made by Stalin that clearly indicate his pretensions. Averell Harriman upon encountering Stalin in Berlin, just prior to Potsdam, congratulated the Marshall on having won a great victory. Stalin's *sole* reply was, "Tsar Alexander went to Paris." And in a 1948 note to Tito, Stalin wrote, "The reason why there is now no Communist government in Paris is because in the circumstance of 1945 the Soviet Army was not able to reach French soil."

Both the price and the length (over 800 pages) are excessive. For example, the final chapter—comprising 50 desultory pages summarizing European international developments from the Truman Doctrine up to the late 1960s—is superfluous. The unfortunate price will restrict the work to the shelves of the better libraries and a few specialists.

Nearly 150 pages of documents are reprinted, including the Yalta and Potsdam protocols. Many of the documents, e.g., the ANZUS Treaty, while quite valuable for a student of the Cold War generally, are of limited relevance to the central concerns of the book. The inclusion of more directly pertinent documents, such as the last correspondence between Roosevelt and Stalin, would have been more appropriate.

The Semblance of Peace is an important contribution to the literature on diplomatic history and international relations. The book is always lucid and well-documented; the authors frequently display keen wit and a facility for relating anecdotes. A very helpful chronology of events, index, useful bibliography, photographs, maps, and even political cartoons round out this prodigious work.

J. Tim Fennell

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The Bootblack Stand

George Washington Plunkitt

Dr. George Washington Plunkitt, our prize-winning political analyst, is celebrating the publication of his new book, which is now available at avant-garde *bookstores throughout New Jersey. Dr. Plunkitt's book is about the importance of altruism in politics and it is titled* What's in It for Me? *Although Dr. Plunkitt expects to earn ten million dollars from sales of his new book, he has agreed to continue to advise public figures through this column. Address all correspondence to The Bootblack Stand, c/o The Establishment, R.R. 11, Box 360, Bloomington, Indiana 47401, Continental U.S.A.*

Dear Mr. Plunkitt:

In your opinion has drinking become a problem in the U.S. Congress?

Sincerely,
Mrs. Morton Norton
Women's Christian Temperance Union
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mrs. Morton:

It is with a great deal of satisfaction that I can assure you that rarely is drinking a problem with any members of the U.S. Congress. The only problem that I am aware of is that both representatives and senators seem to have some difficulty getting the stuff onto the house and senate floors. Bella Abzug has overcome this problem by wearing those otherwise absurd hats and of course Senator Tunney and Senator Kennedy bring their libations in under their pillows. Otherwise, there is no problem to speak of. Almost every solon I know drinks often unquenchably, nor do any of our legislators have any problem eating.

—GWP

Dear Mr. Plunkitt:

For months now I have been attempting to eliminate lavish use of chauffeur-driven limousines by high government officials. There are 789 of these gas guzzling monsters (part of the fleet of nearly half a million government owned vehicles) rumbling through Washington awaiting the whim of top government officials who sup so well at the public trough. I am having difficulty gaining support for my economic drive. I hoped you could come up with a crafty scheme to end this foolish bit of government waste.

Cordially,
Senator William Proxmire

Dear Senator Proxmire:

First of all I object to your adumbration that it is improper for public officials to sup "so well" at the public trough. Supping well is what politics is all about—especially reform politics or welfare politics. This explains my recent conversion to the cause of reform or welfare politics as it is cunningly called. The beauty of these advanced forms of politics is that rather than being faced with the old-fashioned reluctant taxpayer, the reform politician, through his rhetorical artistry, transforms the parsimonious taxpayer into an eager chump. Thus, the taxpayer gladly hands over more and more of his income to the reform boodler, the welfare state prospers, and there are plenty of limos for all.

In Washington today, a limo is not only part of the boodle for service on behalf of one's country, but it is a positive necessity for many top public servants and a health precaution for the general citizenry. For instance if the Hon. Elliott Richardson had to drive himself to work in the morning, vast numbers of pedestrians would be in danger as would this distinguished public servant himself. Everytime he put his paws on the steering wheel, he would attract an army of gendarmes armed with citations of public intoxication and driving under the influences. He would imperil his spotless public record and the impeccable repute of the Nixon Administration.

Senator Proxmire, you have a great deal to learn about statesmanship.

—GWP

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

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Coming in the Next Issue

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Until November 6 California will be the scene of a great pother as Ronald Reagan's intriguing Proposition One faces the hard-pressed electorate. If the proposition is adopted, the California legislature will be constitutionally limited in the amount of taxes it can levy on the state's citizens and a precedent will be set for other states.

The December issue of *The Alternative* will focus on Governor Reagan and his alternative social policies.

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Book Review

The Rise of Radicalism

by Eugene Methvin
Arlington House $9.95

What do Rousseau, Robespierre, Babeuf, Marx, Nechayev, Lenin, and Mao all have in common? If you were to answer that all are influences on, or heroes of, the Left, you would be right. But you would be right again, and you would have stated a more important truth, if you were to answer that all were psychological misfits, neurotics at the very least. This is the main thesis of Eugene Methvin's latest treatise, *The Rise of Radicalism*. Although this book is many things—social history, intellectual history, and an encyclopedia of radicalism—it is basically a study in psychohistory, a study of a distinctive personality type with which humanity has been afflicted at least since Plato but which has become especially pernicious in the last two centuries. The type is the idealistic, violent, and usually intellectual radical, the malcontent who cannot bear the unpleasantness and intractability of a fallen world, who conjures a utopia in his mind, and who does not hesitate to commit the basest atrocities in the attempt to shoehorn reality into his ideal. For all the above-mentioned persons, and for others, Methvin describes the nature and probable origin of their psychopathologies, how they fed themselves on hatred for finite and imperfect man, and how, if given the opportunity, they transformed their inner tension into outer terror.

Why is it only in the last two hundred years that these madmen have had so much influence? Because we now live in the "Age of Megamedia." This is a most felicitous term, for it combines two facts that especially characterize the modern world: the astonishing advance in communications technology, and urbanization, which has brought pliable, mass audiences into existence. From the leaflets, pamphlets, and posters of the French revolutionaries, through the use of radio, loudspeakers, and the airplane by Hitler, to the fawning television journalists of today: read all about it in this book. See how the professional hatemongers manipulate men, create or exacerbate social ills, and build up their international "cartels of hate" in the pursuit of their dreams.

Of course one could pick nits here and there. Methvin hands on two myths about Rousseau: that he advocated a return to nature (in fact, he believed that it was too late for that), and that he thought that men were naturally good (in fact, he believed that we are *a*moral). One might also doubt that Marx was quite the ogre Methvin makes him out to be. There *is* a strenuous effort in the academy to whitewash Marx (Erich Fromm is the worst offender here, I think: Marx loved his wife and all that) and I, being but a product of my academic environment, do not yet know which interpretation is closer to the truth. Methvin does point out that Marx—fortunately, I should think—never acquired political power, so we shall never know how he would have used it. One might also have wanted a chapter or at least a few pages on Herzen who, though not a vicious man, was the first Russian socialist and a typical alienated intellectual.

But these are, again, only nits, and although the academic-minded might complain, they do not detract from the soundness of the author's thesis.

The reader will find here innumerable points of special interest: Marx's psychosomaticism, Lenin's being influenced far less by Marx than by the Russian Jacobins (especially Nechayev, who invented the professional revolutionary, and whose chilling description is included), Lenin as the first applied sociologist, and the ease with which Mussolini and Hitler fit the psychological type usually reserved for fanatics of the socialist genus. All in all, this book is an excellent introduction to violent radicalism.

Jack Simmons

THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA

(continued from page 4)

at individual rates, ranging up to 70 percent, on all the profits of their businesses. Corporations pay a 22 percent tax on the first $25,000 of income, 48 percent on everything over that. Of course, a corporation's stockholders pay ordinary income taxes on all the dividends they take out of the company, but the immediate tax impact on the business need not be so severe.

So there they are, America's 12 million businesses. How can the government ever hope to keep an eye on all of them?

Actually, of course, it doesn't. Smaller businesses with sixty or fewer employees are exempt from controls. Ironically enough, the government relies on free market forces to keep the little businesses more or less in line. It hopes that the larger enterprises, subject to controls, will put competitive pressures on the small firms to keep their prices down.

To some extent the pressures are working. In many areas and industries, however, the pressures are weak or nonexistent, as many citizens can testify as they watch the prices they pay edge ever higher. A controlled economy is at best a rather messy place.

Of course the free market and competition would work among the large corporations, too, if not always in ways that the controllers would prefer. The primary aim of the government is to hold prices down, no matter what. Yet the federal economists are wise enough to recognize that they should encourage an increase in the supply of goods reaching the market.

The two aims, unfortunately, can conflict. The government, for example, is permitting businessmen to pass along to their customers only the exact dollar amount of any increases in costs. To the man on the street that probably sounds eminently fair. Yet what it means to the businessman is a reduced yield on the dollars he has invested in his business.

If a corporation's profit margins are being squeezed, it will find it harder to borrow money, sell stock, or generate earnings to finance the new factories and equipment it needs to produce more.

Government economic controls, no matter how wisely constructed and administered, simply cannot cope with anything as dynamic as American business. By their nature controls work to preserve the status quo. In business the status quo can be deadly.

American business thrives on failure. Every year proprietors, partners, and corporate executives test their products and services in the market. If they meet the public's needs and wants efficiently they succeed, but every year many thousands of them fail.

The failure of an enterprise releases resources of materials and manpower to seek more useful employment elsewhere. Society has devised unemployment compensation and other institutions to cushion the shock of change, but to prevent change serves no one's true interest.

In the market a price rise may persuade businessmen to produce more or it may induce consumers to buy less, or it may do a little of both. A price increase thus can carry the seeds of its own destruction.

In a controlled economy, however, supply and demand do not operate directly on price. When prices are held artificially low, producers are discouraged from adding to supply and consumers are encouraged to buy. The obvious result: shortages. Pretty soon, the controls will collapse or they will have to be supplemented by extensive rationing to spread the scarce goods around.

As Mr. Coolidge said, the business of America is business. And it would be nice if more Americans knew more about how their business really works. □

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"Whom the gods destroy they first make mad"– Euripedes

Current Wisdom

THE ULCEROUS AESTHETICS

While reviewing the merits of a recent Supreme Court decision on spicy stuff, Dr. John Leonard, novelist, elucidates the well-known "ulcer theory" of aesthetics, a theory which enchants cosmopolitans and raises every nuisance to the level of artiste:

Art isn't "average." It tends toward extremes. It's been trying for more than a century to make us uncomfortable. (Unlike, say, TV.) To return the sanctioning of what's permissible in art to those very communities it may be trying to discomfit is to ensure censorship and mediocrity. We are back inside the frontier mentality.

—New York Times Book Review

DTs

Anthony Burgess, bard, offers a genuine, high-toned treatise on liberty while simultaneously slathering over the fundamentals of his trade:

Freedom is always a terrible responsibility, but no human being may shirk it. To leave it to others to decide what is good or bad for us is a sinful abdication of a human right and a human duty.

My misgivings about total permissiveness in art are entirely esthetic. It is the purpose of all art to shock—that is, to impel the viewer, reader or auditor to see with new eyes what he has previously taken for granted, to recognize certain patterns or relationships in life that were formerly hidden or insufficiently apparent. Art that merely soothes is not art at all; it may even be thought of as anti-art. The Muzak that twangs and buzzes in public buildings and restaurants and on aircraft uses the materials of art for what is literally an anesthetic purpose: More, it is an intrusion on the privacy of the sense and mind, and I would have no hesitation about outlawing it. Anti-art dulls awareness; art enhances it.

—New York Times Magazine

THE REAL CONSERVATIVES

After many years of earnestly searching for genuine conservatives—not "ultra-conservatives" or "ultra-ultra-conservatives" or "extreme conservatives"—Godfrey Sperling has finally found them:

These people (the Watergaters) felt deeply about the direction of our country and the need to carry on a counter-revolution . . . it was this zeal for re-establishing a conservative approach to running this country that was really at work in the campaign excess.

—Christian Science Monitor

THE PURSUIT OF TRUTH

A devastating moment of candor, in an otherwise idiotic discourse:

You're continually trying to find rationality behind what people do politically—particularly what the Left does politically. The thrust of the Left is against reason. It's anti-rational. That's why it's anarchistic and nihilistic. It's anti-rational . . . The motivation behind, say, the desire for those abstractions doesn't come intellectually. It comes emotionally. It comes out of the gut. And that's why attacking the Left for this and attacking the Left for that is a very rational argument, but it doesn't work.

—Dotson Rader on *Firing Line*

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Profound observations from the intellectual minds of Time magazine as they consider one of Hollywood's most prodigious artistes:

Monroe was the essence of soft, vacuous femininity—but she could be as bright and unyielding as a diamond, and she had deep yearnings for intellectuality.

—Time

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

The shameful state of historical perspective at one of America's most intellectual gazettes:

Furthermore, for the first time in history we've had a quasi-conspiracy to grab an election. And for the first time in history we've had burglars on the White House payroll.

—New Republic

TRUST THE NATION

An intelligent rebuttal of the fiend, Banfield:

Strict racial inferiority is still too strong for many to accept in a society where overt racism is considered impolite. A more subtle approach, like the one used by Edward Banfield in *The Unheavenly City* (reportedly one of the President's favorite books), is far preferable. Banfield argues that those doomed to perpetual inferiority are not the black, as such, but poor people of all sorts, whose inability to plan for the future through delayed gratification consigns them to perpetual servitude. This is the intellectual version of a Jerry Birbach at Forest Hills, who says that he is not against blacks living in his neighborhood, just all poor folks—as if that made it better. Class chauvinism is in many ways more profoundly reaction than racism, and Banfield's book will be the text of class chauvinism for some time to come.

—Nation

OLDE CURIOSITY SHOPPE

Curious reasoning from one of Dissent's schoolmarms:

A Kristol essay, commanding in tone, supremely confident about subjects that are elsewhere held to be still in the flux of controversy, assuming always that anyone who thinks differently is perverse or inept, is scarcely designed to incite reasoned discussion.

—Dissent

MAKING RELEVANCE EDUCATIONAL

Proof the open university flourishes on the world's most famous island:

One of Britain's most controversial psychologists, whose views on genetics and race have provoked argument on both sides of the Atlantic, was attacked at the London School of Economics yesterday afternoon less than a minute after he had begun a lecture.

Professor Hans Jurgen Eysenck, Professor of Psychology at London University, who is 57, was pulled to the floor in the LSE's new theatre when he was attacked by a group of about 26 people. He was punched, kicked and spat on. His spectacles were broken and the side of his nose cut before, shocked and bewildered, he was dragged clear by members of the student executive.

Professor Eysenck was taken by a taxi in a dazed state to the Maudsley Hospital, Denmark Hill, where he was treated for shock and cuts, but was found to be otherwise uninjured. He is also Director of the Psychological Department at the hospital.

Three hours later other student leaders were attacked in the same lecture hall when they tried to address a meeting called by the LSE's Afro-Asian Society, a left-wing-dominated body with more Asian than African support.

Mr. Joe Cummings, one of the "mature" students, who tried to calm the meeting, called after the incident involving Dr. Eysenck, was thumped by militants and forced to flee for the exit door.

His colleagues, who attempted to clear a way for him, were similarly attacked.

One of them, Mr. Rex Osborne, from Grays, Essex, a second-year student studying economic history, was severely bitten on the left arm; Mr. Nick Spurrier, another history student, was thrown down a flight of stairs; and Mr. David Thomas, from Penarth, Glamorgan, had his arm trapped in a door.

One of the student executive said last night: "This has put the LSE back several years. Even in the days of protests and demonstrations, sit-ins and talk-ins there was nothing like this."

—London Times

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CONTINUING CRISIS
(continued from page 2)

ionism scored a splendid triumph in Lagos when that progressive metropolis' 20,000 women of delight announced their unionization, a move designed to win the Nigerian government's recognition of their venerable profession. In a decision that gave the boot to Korean cultural freedom and insulted millions of American aesthetes, the South Korean Education Ministry banned *The Godfather*. And Victoria, the strangely popular inmate at Beirut's women's prison, upon closer inspection, turned out to be a man.

● Back in the states the crusade for female justice continues. Women's tennis' premier virtuoso, Billie Jean King, downed the saucy Bobby Riggs, a middle-aged male star from the 1940s, while millions of misogynists clutched their throats. After the event seven hundred Smith College women demonstrated in celebration of the new dawn. Martha Mitchell separated from the former Attorney General, and a spokesbeing for the Coast Guard confirmed rumors that it had repealed anachronistic requirements stipulating separate comfort stations on ships. Finally, a leading producer of athletic equipment announced that it is exploring the feasibility of producing athletic supporters for women.

● An indication of the growing economic sophistication of some American businessmen was revealed when a group of modern J.P. Morgans suggested a "Nixon Center" be named after the author of wage and price controls and be "dedicated to free enterprise." It was announced that the cost of living had taken yet another giant step. The paper shortage continues. Gas stations went on strike throughout the country during the last week of September, and in St. Louis authorities at Anheuser-Busch, the world's largest brewery, declared a shortage of the national nectar. But the most ominous piece of economic news comes from Salt Lake City where the City Commission hiked the fee for late burials in the city cemetery. All those not interred by 4:30 P.M. will be charged $25 an hour.

● On the very day that Secretariat won the $250,000 Marlboro Cup at Belmont, Sweden's Good King Gustav passed on. Bloodless officials in Brentwood, New Jersey, have eschewed clinical treatment of those 12,000 pheasants, who were supposedly exposed to equine encephalitis, and instead gassed the entire flock. However, hope lingers for those 200 beagle puppies now suffering at the hands of Air Force pollutant researchers. The redoubtable National Anti-Vivisection Society has filed suit in Chicago on their behalf. And from Chicago comes more good news via two audacious pediatric researchers who have found that youngsters will actually benefit more from communes than from the antiquated nuclear family. According to Dr. Robert W. Deisher and Charley M. Johnston, commune-bred youngsters "related to sex as something interesting and enjoyable but not of central importance." "Sexuality was expressed early, and actual intercourse occurred between most youngsters by the age of 5 or 6." On September 13 Mr. Mumtag Rahawi was freed after being convicted for trying to blow up his wife with a mortar shell.

● From the education world we hear that one in three women fail in their attempts at contraception. In Bakersfield, California, Leonard W. Comeau, 19, took the hand of the former Ela Mae Fisher, 72. And Sister Elizabeth McAlister, who recently married the Rev. Philip Berrigan, sent a thrill through radical religious communities when she was booked for stealing a chain saw from a Sears Roebuck store. Can this be a weird new religious experience?

● But the month's gravest loss was not suffered by religious radicals but by American art lovers when they learned that Mr. Abbie Hoffman has indefinitely postponed editing videotapes of his vasectomy. Mr. Hoffman and three colleagues were arrested for merchanting $500,000 worth of cocaine to undercover agents. □

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

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